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L INTRODUCTION 
This paper is concerned with U.S. international policy regard-
ing direct broadcast satellites (DBS). DBS satellites broadcast 
radio and television signals from 22,300 miles above the equator 
directly to homes equipped with small receiver dishes. Present 
U.S. DBS policy is at odds with the great majority of the nations of 
the world, including countries having relatively open and closed 
mass communication systems. The U.S. position insists upon the 
absolute right of every state and person to engage in transborder 
communications by DBS and upon the free flow of information 
among countries of the world without regard to borders or fron-
tiers. This paper analyzes U.S. DBS free flow policy and its prac-
tical implications by drawing upon and comparing domestic broad-
cast policy and practice. 
Part I sets forth the three main policy proposals for DBS thus 
far advanced and their supporting rationales. Part II describes the 
structural decisions made and being made regarding DBS technol-
ogy, the accretion of influence which early decisions regarding 
new communications technology tend to have, and the significance 
of threshold structural decisions for development of international 
DBS service. Parts III and IV explore the alternative operational 
models available for international DBS service, the relationship of 
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these models to the three major policy proposals, and the type of 
programming likely to result under these models. 
Part V explores the potential economic, administrative and 
political costs of U.S. DBS policy and the practical implications of 
the free flow position. 
Part VI distinguishes U.S. DBS policy from its policy on inter-
national human rights and press freedom, and then compares U.S. 
international and domestic broadcast policy. The affirmative 
theory of the first amendment is developed as an alternative to 
the U.S. absolutist free flow position. Part VII considers the affirm-
ative first amendment theory as it contrasts with the three main 
policy proposals for DBS, and discusses the opportunity for con-
gruity between U.S. domestic and international broadcast policy 
under the affirmative theory. 
Part VIII considers more particularly the ways in which ac-
commodation might be reached on the actual operation of an inter-
national DBS system by comparing the rules and practices of the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), operating under the 
Communications Act of 1934, with general and specific recommen-
dations of the MacBride Commission Report on international com-
munication problems. The possibilities of harmony between the 
Communications Act and the MacBride Report and the respon-
siveness of various domestic initiatives to specific concerns raised 
by the MacBride Commission are also developed. 
The paper concludes that present U.S. international DBS 
policy (i) is fundamentally inconsistent with domestic broadcast 
law and practice; (ii) may ultimately undermine the U.S. objective 
of encouraging communication in the international community; 
and (iii) may threaten U.S. economic interests at home and abroad. 
The conclusion further suggests that advancement by the U.S. of a 
free flow position may do a disservice to its own rich experience in 
reconciling communication values with new communication tech-
nology, may deprive other nations of the benefits of this applied 
knowledge, and could delay realization of the great cross-cultural 
communication potential of DBS technology.1 
1. The complex and many-faceted questions surrounding DBS technology and use 
have attracted much scholarly attention. For background on the subject, see generally, C. 
ALEXANDROWICZ, THE LAW OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS (1971); ASPEN INSTITUTE PROGRAM 
ON COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIETY, CONTROL OF THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE: VALUES 
IN CONFLICT (1974); A. CHAYES, J. FAWCETT, M. ITO & A. KISS, SATELLITE BROADCASTING 
(1973); I. DE SOLA POOL, THE SATELLITE BROADCAST CONTROVERSY (1974); T. EMERSON, THE 
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IL PRESENT POLICY PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL 
DBS SERVICE 
Since the advent of the satellite technology in the early 1960s, 
international concern has focused upon the potential use of satel-
lites to broadcast radio and television signals directly into homes 
across national borders. Unlike the mails and point-to-point tele-
communication services passing through national gateways, direct 
broadcast satellites allow a transmitting state or private entity to 
reach citizens of another state without the receiving state's coop-
eration or consent. And unlike terrestrial broadcasting, which is 
limited in its penetration of foreign borders,2 a single DBS signal 
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); E. GALLOWAY, THE POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY OF 
SATELLITE COMMUNICATION (1972); P. LASKIN & A. CHAYES, DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM 
SATELLITES: POLICIES AND PROBLEMS (1975); D. LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM (1970); THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LA.W OF COMMUNICATIONS (E. McWhinney ed. 1971); UNESCO, INTERNATIONAL COM-
MISSION FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD: COM-
MUNICATIONS AND SOCIETY TODAY AND TOMORROW (1980). See also Chayes & Chazen, Policy 
Problems in Direct Broadcasting from Satellites, 5 STAN. J. INT'L STUDIES 4 (1970); The Con-
trol of Program Content in International Telecommunications (The Friedmann Series in In-
ternational Law), 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1-81 (1974); Dauses, Direct Television Broad-
casting by Satellites and the Freedom of Information, 3 J. SPACE L. 59 (1975); Special Project, 
Direct Broadcast Satellites and Space Law Symposium, 3 J. SPACE L. 107 (1975); Grad & 
Goldfarb, Government Regulation of International Telecommunications, 15 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 386 (1976); LeDuc, Transforming Principles into Policy 30/2 J. COM. 196 
(1980); Powell, Direct Broadcast Satellites: The Conceptual Convergence of the Free Flow 
of Information and National Sovereignty, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1975); Price, The First 
Amendment and Television Broadcasting by Satellite., 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 879 (1976); Rice, 
Regulation of DBS: International Constraints and Domestic Options, 25 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 
813 (1980); Robinson, Regulating International Airwaves: the 1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 1 (1980); Ruddy, American Constitutional Law and Restrictions on the Content of 
Private International Broadcasting, 5 INT'L LAW 102 (1971); Rutkowski, The 1979 World Ad-
ministrative Radio Conference: The ITU in a Changing World, 13 INT'L LAW 289 (1979); 
Rutkowski, United States Policy Making for the International Forums on Communication, 
8 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 95 (1980); Snow, INTELSAT: An International Example, 30/2 J. 
COM. 147 (1980). See also, Comment, Direct Satellite Broadcasting and the First Amend-
ment, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J. 514 (1974); Note, Direct Broadcast Satellites and Freedom of 
Speech, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 374 (1974); Note, Radio Propaganda in the Contexts of Interna-
tional Regulation and the Free Flow of Information as a Human Right, 5 BROOKLYN J. INT'L 
L. 154 (1979); Note, Toward the Free Flow of Information: Direct Television Broadcasting 
Via Satellite, 13 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 329 (1979). 
2. Until recently, terrestrial broadcast stations could expect to serve an area with a 
radius no greater than about 100 miles. Class I stations, operating on clear channels at not 
less than 10 kw power (and usually operating at 50 kw) could serve such an area. More 
recently, "superstations" operating at up to 500 kws have been proposed; these statiom 
could serve an area with a radius over 400 miles. Although such a proposed service area is 
much larger than conventional broadcast coverage, it is still infinitesimal compared to the 
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can cover forty percent of the earth's surface, encompassing many 
countries and cultures.3 The unique communication potential of 
DBS has spawned major international debate reflecting the hopes 
and fears of diverse societies for this new technology.4 Although 
the issues of DBS have been deliberated extensively for nearly 
two decades in a multiplicity of international public and private 
forums, unfortunately, little agreement has been achieved.5 
The countries of the world have been aligned in three groups 
over the question of DBS. The largest group, led by the U.S.S.R., 
has argued for the absolute sovereign right of every state to con-
trol communications coming within its borders in order to protect 
the integrity of its domestic communication system and cultural 
values. This group has also sought the adoption of an international 
area of service possible from a satellite in geostationary orbit. Shortwave radio is capable of 
covering greater distances, but is technologically inferior as a medium of communication to 
AM, FM and TV spectrum frequencies. 
3. Coverage possible from a single satellite under ideal conditions would be one-third 
to 40% of the earth. "Broadcasting from Satellites," Working Paper of Canada and Sweden, 
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/49, Appendix 7, at 90 (1979). 
The concept of resource scarcity is a familiar one in communications law; it underlies, 
along with the obvious need for careful coordination and cooperation, the domestic govern-
ment's right to regulate, and is the tacit assumption upon which international a priori - a 
posteriori discussions are grounded. Mr. Justice White noted in 1969 that scarcity of usable 
spectrum space might not remain a dispositive consideration, since technological 
developments would tend to make more spectrum, and more efficient methods of its use, 
available. The latter, at least, has proved true, and progress continues. It is remarkable, 
however, that such extensions of the limits of this natural resource do not in fact cure the 
problem of scarcity, since use and demand also continue to grow. One can assume from past 
developments and reasonable probabilities that demand will continue to exceed supply. 
Direct broadcasting from satellites entails the use of the geostationary oribt, a band 
of outer space roughly 36,000 km. from the earth and located over the equator. It is prac-
ticable within this band to maintain a satellite in geosynchronous orbit, that is, in a virtually 
constant position relative to the earth; such a satellite offers obvious advantages over the 
original "tracking" satellites, which are in constant motion around the earth. Because this 
geostationary orbit band has physical boundaries, the resource is clearly limited. Early 
stages of geostationary orbit development, some fifteen years ago, offered roughly 180 
satellite "slots"; although advanced tecnhology has served, by decreasing interference and 
"stacking" satellites, to triple that number, it is clear that the band is finite and that con-
cerns of scarcity continue to be valid. 
4. Major forums of debate have included the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), infra note 11; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), infra section IX; and the United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), whose Scientific and Technical Subcommittee 
recommended in 1964 that intensive study of DBS be undertaken; the UNCOPUOS Working 
Group on DBS was formed in 1968 as a direct response to this suggestion. 
5. A summary report of the remarks of representatives to the Working Group on 
DBS, of COPUOS, found at U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.310 (1979), makes clear just how lit-
tle agreement there is. 
4
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1981], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol8/iss2/2
1981] Prior Consent 269 
code governing the content of all DBS programs; the code would 
prohibit broadcast of material which (i) threatened international 
peace; (ii) interfered with the internal affairs of another state; (iii) 
encroached on fundamental freedoms, specifically the right to be 
free from discrimination based on race, sex, language or religion; 
(iv) propagandized or promoted violence, horrors, pornography, 
and the use of narcotics; (v) misinformed the public on local culture 
and traditions; or (vi) misinformed the public on these matters.6 
The second group of states, led by Canada and Sweden, has 
also accepted the sovereign right of a state to control the content 
of DBS programs broadcast into its territory, but has · resisted 
adoption of an international DBS programming code. Instead, this 
group has proposed regional and bilateral arrangements for inter-
national DBS service which insure that all recipient states par-
ticipate in the production of imported programming.7 
The U.S., sometimes standing alone, has steadfastly rejected 
the sovereign right to prior consent to transborder communication 
and has argued for a free flow of information in the international 
community. The U.S. has urged a close relationship between the 
free flow of information and the realization of the individual right 
to form tastes, opinions and beliefs freely through access to a suit-
able array of ideas and values. The U.S. has feared that this fun-
damental right would be seriously compromised, domestically and 
internationally, by either the adoption of an international code of 
DBS programming content or the establishment of international 
institutional arrangements to govern the conduct of DBS opera-
tions.8 Although the U.S. has acknowledged the generalized duty 
of every state to respect the cultural traditions and sensibilities of 
other states, it has asserted that this would best be achieved 
through decentralized, private arrangements, without the involve-
ment of public international authorities.9 
6. U.S.S.R. Working Papers, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/117, Annex III (1972) and U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.105/127 Annex II (1974). 
7. Canadian-Swedish proposal, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/117, Annex IV (1973) and U.N. 
Doc. A/AC.1051127, Annex IV (1979). 
8. U.S. proposal, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/127, Annex IV (1979); see also remarks of U.S. 
representative in summary, supra note 5. 
9. See Chayes & Laskin, A Report of the Panel on International Telecommunica-
tions Policy, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM 
SATELLITES: POLICIES AND PROBLEMS 1 (1975). One of the most scholarly considerations 'to 
date of. U.S. international DBS policy, the Report suggested that three principles had to be 
balanced to formulate an international framework for direct satellite broadcasting: the free 
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The failure to reach accommodation on international DBS ser-
vice has reached an important point. Development of DBS technol-
ogy is progressing rapidly, and critical structural and operational 
decisions have been and are being made on its implementation, 
scheduled to begin around 1985.10 The International Telecom-
munications Union (ITU),11 an independent United Nations (U.N.) 
flow of information, the value of cultural diversity, and the right of every nation to deter-
mine for itself the scope and character of the television services available to its people. 
The Report criticized the Soviet proposals for DBS programming codes as impractical 
in concept and scope and as an unwarranted sacrifice of the principle of the free flow of in-
formation and ideas. The Panel doubted that precise meanings could be attached to the 
language of the proposed code sufficient to form a consensus, which is rare even within a 
single society. It believed that amendment of the code in response to accumulated ex-
perience would be exceedingly difficult, resulting in excessive rigidity at a time when DBS 
needed flexibility to develop regional and national programming acceptable to the vast new 
audiences. 
Two weaknesses were cited in the Canada-Sweden proposal of prior consent coupled 
with recipient state participation in program production. First, the Panel found no limita-
tion on the right of a state to withhold consent in disregard of international standards, prin-
ciples or obligations. It believed the latitude thus implied in the Canada-Sweden position 
was too broad and that states should be bound by the developing norms of the international 
community in exercising control over transborder DBS television. The second major defi-
ciency in the proposal cited was that it seemed to allow for program-by-program refusal by 
states. The Panel was concerned that should the right to prior consent be exercised on a 
per-program basis, it would allow a type of prior review and restraint offensive to free 
speech tradition, or would, at best, result in overwhelming administrative backlogs, in-
hibiting the free flow of ideas. Finally, the Panel feared that program-by-program approval 
would disserve DBS development by rendering audience access too uncertain to justify the 
heavy initial investment in satellite hardware and programming necessary to start up a 
system. Long-term, assured access to the intended audience was seen as critical to public 
and private investment in international DBS services. 
The Panel Report was also critical of the U.S. position, finding that it failed to give 
proper weight to the interest in diversity and the desire of states to determine for 
themselves their national television services. The Panel found the U.S. to be in a unique 
position in the DBS field, unthreatened by foreign program service because of the cultural 
and linguistic isolation, a highly viable domestic television system, and superiority in satel-
lite technology. 
The Report of the Panel concluded that there is a widespread unwillingness among 
nations to accept a laissez-faire attitude toward transborder direct broadcasting, but that 
there is little agreement as to the scope and character of the necessary regulation. 
10. This estimate was made by the Satellite Television Corporation (STC), a division 
of the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), in its April 1981 application to the 
FCC for authority to build and launch one or more direct broadcast satellites. BROAD-
CASTING, July 6, 1981, at 30. 
11. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), founded in 1865 as the Inter-
national Telegraph Union, is the oldest international agency, and the one central to the 
achievement of international agreement on the use of telecommunications. The dual pur-
poses stated by the ITU are to increase cooperation and to decrease harmful spectrum in-
terference between nations. The Radio Regulations of the ITU provide specific controls 
over communications; periodic World Administrative Radio Conferences (W ARCs) are held 
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agency, has divided the countries of the world into three regions, 12 
and in two of these regions satellite orbital positions and frequen-
cies have already been assigned.13 Out of the hundreds of DBS 
assignments made in these two regions, only nine nations made 
reservations for international service;14 and the three services so 
involved are all marked by close cultural and religious 
transborder identification. The individual nations rece1vmg 
assignments are already developing operational plans for national 
DBS systems which may limit future opportunities for interna-
tional service. U.S. satellite operators have expressed their views 
to the FCC on the importance of initial decisions regarding alloca-
tions of geostationary orbit space.15 No reservation has thus far 
to update or modify these guidelines. These regulations, like the Convention itself, bind 
signatory nations (of whom there are presently 154) with the authority of a treaty. 
The ITU is organized in three plenary bodies: the Plenipotentiary Conference, which 
holds supreme authority and deals with the ITU's structure and finances; the Administra-
tive Conference, discussed above; and the International Radio Consultative Committee 
(CCIR), which makes non-binding recommendations. See, Rice, Regulation of DBS: Interna-
tional Constraints and Domestic Options, 25 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 813 (1980), note 4-18 and 
accompanying text; Jacobson, International Institutions for Telecommunications: the ITU's 
Role, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 51 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971). 
12. Region I includes Africa, Europe and the Middle East; Region II - the Western 
Hemsphere, including Greenland, and Region III - Asia (including the USSR), Australia and 
the South Pacific. Although there was discussion at the 1979 W ARC of creating a fourth 
region, comprised solely of Africa, the representatives of the African nations were unable to 
achieve the degree of unity necessary to accomplish this. Hart, A Review of WARC- '79, 2 
CoM. & L. 21, 29 n.33 (1980). 
13. Regions I and III worked out their frequency allocations at the 1977 W ARC; the 
agreements came into force on Jan. l, 1979. Final Acts, World Broadcasting-Satellite Ad-
ministrative Radio Conference, ITU, Geneva, 1977. 
14. The reservations for international service were all made within Region I, and 
were as follows: Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden made reservation as 
NORDSAT; Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Syria reserved for the Islamic Network (still pro-
spective); and the Vatican reserved for broadcast throughout Italy. 
15. Major U.S. communications· satellite operators have urged the FCC to retain as 
much flexibility as possible in any geostationary orbit allocations to be made at the Space 
W ARC in 1984. Rigidity in such allocations can result in waste and in poorly developed ser-
vices. Such operators as COMSAT, AT&T, Southern Pacific Communications and Satellite 
Business Systems would prefer to keep the present (a posteriori) allocation system, but that 
seems impossible given the new balance of powers in the ITU. Various proposals for alloca-
tion are presently under study by the International Radio Consultative Committee of the 
ITU, and the domestic operators urge the formation of a U.S. government industrial ad-
visory committee. It is also recommended that whatever allocations are made be temporary 
or time-limited, since predictions about technological developments and service require-
ments over a span of years are bound to be inaccurate. The operators stress the possibility 
of irreversible damage which might result from rigid assignments now, and emphasize the 
need to stimulate and encourage development of communications capacities to the greatest 
extent possible. 
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been made for use by the U .N. or its affiliated committees and 
organizations, nor for the European Economic Community or any 
of its related agencies. Region II, which includes North, Central 
and South America and the Caribbean, will determine its DBS ser-
vice assignments in 1983 at a Regional Administrative Radio Con-
ference (RARC) in Rio de Janeiro. At present, no plans have been 
developed for international DBS service to the people of the 
Western Hemisphere. 
III DURABILITY OF INITIAL STRUCTURAL AND 
OPERATIONAL DECISIONS 
Structural and operational decisions16 regarding the im-
plementation of new communication technology have had enduring 
importance, sometimes long surviving their initial rationales and 
technological advances. Increasingly complex economic, institu-
tional and technical arrangements build and depend upon the 
threshold decisions of what spectrum resources will be allocated 
to the new service, what entities will have the opportunity to pro-
vide the service, and how the service will be operated and 
regulated. These initial decisions limit future policy and institu-
tional options. 
The development of U.S. terrestrial broadcast service and the 
early alloc:ation of radio frequencies among countries in the Amer-
icas illustrate the longevity of formative decisions. The threshold 
structural decisions made by the 1934 Congress (at a time when 
only AM radio existed) as to spectrum access, ownership, manage-
ment and regulation of broadcast stations have survived genera-
tions of new mass communications technologies and service.11 The 
1934 Communications Act, only slightly amended, remains the cor-
16. Structural and operational regulation of communication services is distinguishable 
from content regulation. Structural regualtion seeks to encourage programming service in 
the public interest indirectly through control of industry composition and firm conduct. Con-
tent regulation involves direct review and control of programs and schedules. See Inquiry 
and Proposed Rulemaking; Deregulation of Radio, 44 Fed. Reg. 57,636, 57,662-668 (1979). 
17. 47 U.S.C. §§151-607 (1976) (as amended) [hereinafter cited as Communications Act]. 
Although the Communications Act states clearly that a license to spectrum use car-
ries no property rights or ownership, it is undeniable that broadcasters do feel that they 
have rights to this resource. This belief is encouraged by the necessity of making sizable in-
itial investments, as well as by the need for continuity of service. While each license bears a 
clear statement that no property rights attach, the desire for maximum service has 
necessitated at least tacit assurances of permanence, thus allowing broadcasters to build 
stable audience bases and to realize return on their investments. 
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nerstone of domestic broadcast law.18 Likewise the spectrum allo-
cation decisions made by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion in 1952 for VHF television, which provided for at least three 
stations to every major city in the country, 19 rapidly resulted in the 
development of the three national commercial networks, which are 
today unchallenged in their dominance of the U.S. television in-
dustry. 
An example of the durability of international structural deci-
sions20 is the recent dispute regarding the FCC proposal to de-
crease spacing of AM radio frequency allocations in Region II from 
18. Although the FCC has recently deregulated domestic radio broadcasters, reliev-
ing them of past public interest obligations, the deregulation rules left intact the radio 
broadcasters' fairness and equal opportunity responsibilities, and were passed on broad-
caster assurances that broadcasters would be as, or more, responsive to public needs and in-
terests without regulation as with. Moreover, the Commission has indicated its readine~ to 
reassert regulatory controls should it determine that deregulation is not serving the public 
interest. 
The commercial radio deregulation rules eliminated (i) guidelines requiring the pres-
entation by licensees of specified levels of non-entertainment programming, (ii) formal com-
munity ascertainment procedures, (iii) guidelines limiting the air time devoted to commer-
cial advertising, and (iv) rules requiring the maintenance of comprehensive program logs. 
Report and Order, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888 (1981). The Commission concluded that with over 
8,900 radio stations transmitting in the country, there was sufficient competition within the 
industry so that market forces would be a better determinant of station conduct than 
regulation. DBS technology is, obviously, at a very different stage of development. 
19. In 1952, the FCC added 70 UHF (470-890 MHz) channels to the twelve existing 
VHF (54-216 MHz) channels, and made more than 2,000 channel assignments in about 1300 
communities. Faced with the alternatives of creating clear channels, where broadcasting 
would be regional or even nationwide, or local service, where broadcasting would serve 
small locales, the FCC opted for the latter. Clear channel service would have provided six or 
seven stations to each receiver regardless of location, but would have afforded fewer broad-
casters the opportunity to participate; programming would have been on a national or large-
region scale. The allocation method chosen provided an average of three stations per 
receiver (more in densely populated areas), but was designed to allow reflection of local 
needs and interests, and to afford many broadcasters the oppotunity to participate. Pro-
gramming was foreseen as specific to the locale. 
The inefficiencies which resulted (e.g., service assignments in unpopulated areas, or 
areas so sparsely populated as to preclude development of local service, and allocation 
shortages in densely populated areas) have often been complained of. In addition, one of the 
major reasons for choosing the local-oriented formula, i.e. the fear of "homogenization" of 
the nation through national, lowest-common-denominator programming for clear channels, 
seems to have been as fully realized through networking - at least this is a charge often 
levied by critics of contemporary television service in the U.S. See, LEDUC, CABLE TELEVI-
SION AND THE FCC: A CRISIS IN MEDIA CONTROL (1973). 
20. FCC Commissioner Cross remarked in 1960, during Congress' deliberations on 
whether to ratify the 1950 North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA); 
"Each new international agreement in this complex and fast-growing field is more difficult 
to negotiate than its predecessor." Exec. Report No. 2, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). 
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10 kHz to 9 kHz.21 Region II spectrum allocations, based upon 10 
kHz spaces between assigned frequencies, were originally made in 
1937;22 major adjustments (preceded by years of conferences and 
discussions) were made in 1950.23 The spacing rearrangement pro-
posed in 1979 by the FCC was technologically feasible within vary-
ing cost estimates,24 and offered th~ provision of twelve new chan-
nels and up to 1400 new stations. The reassignment was strongly 
resisted, however, by established domestic and foreign broad-
casters.25 They argued that the cost to convert would be high, not 
only in terms of engineering and materials, but also in terms of 
station identification and advertising; and that there was reason 
to believe that these costs would fall unevenly among stations and 
21. Three years ago, the Daytime Broadcasters Association (DBA), in hopes of gaining 
full-time frequency allocations, took up the cause of decreasing AM frequency spacing. The 
National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA), then headed by Henry 
Geller, proposed the idea to the FCC by peition filed Ja:n. 10, 1979. The DBA and NTIA 
were joined by others seeking spectrum access - the National Black Media Coalition 
(NBMC), National Public Radio (NPR), and the Cubans, for example. Cuba had long been 
agitating for more spectrum space and less interference from U.S. stations, and had 
threatened to install two 500-watt superstations on frequencies duplicating two Florida sta-
tions. (By at least one estimation, that of William Salmon, special assistant to James 
Buckley, Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, the 
threat was an idle one; Cuba has inadequate power resources to support such broadcasting. 
BROADCASTING, Nov. 9, 1981, at 44, 46. The possibility of Cuban superstations was, however, 
seen by most as real). Although no promises were ever made, many hoped that the new 
assignments, in providing Cuba with more stations, would quell this threat. The FCC made 
its formal proposal in Notice of Inquiry in the Matter of 9kHz Channel Spacing for AM 
Broadcasting, 44 Fed. Reg. 39,550 (1979). 
22. Inter-American Radio Communications Convention, Dec. 13, 1937, with Annexes, 
53 Stat. 1576, T.S. No. 938, reprinted in 3 BEAVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949 462 (1969). This Convention in-
cluded the Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay and the United States. It was signed in Havana on December 13, 1937. 
23. North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, Nov. 15, 1950, 11 U.S.T. 413, 
T.l.A.S. No. 4460. This Agreement (NARBA) involved the Bahamas, Canada, Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic and the United States. (A separate agreement between Mexico and the 
U.S. was concluded later that year). NARBA was signed in Washington in November 1950, 
although it wasn't ratified by the U.S. until ten years later. 
24. The estimates originally given by the FCC were substantially lower than those 
provided by the industry, or by industry-retained research groups. Aggregate engineering 
costs involved in station conversions have been estimated at from twenty million dollars 
(original FCC estimate) to forty-three million dollars (private research group). BROAD-
CASTING, July 27, 1981, at 29. 
25. The provision of new channels would result in increased competition and, by all 
estimates, in at least a minimal increase in interference. The FCC originally estimated 
overall service area losses of 2.4%-5%. BROADCASTING, July 27, 1981, at 29. A Canadian 
study, however, found probable service area losses of up to 45%, with 50% of all broad-
casters bearing losses of at least 5%. BROADCASTING, July 27, 1981, at 7. 
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cause greater hardship in some states than in others.26 Resistance 
from the U.S. National Association of Broadcasters and from con-
servative sources within the FCC itself was supported by Canada 
and other countries in Region 11.27 The FCC finally withdrew its 
proposal in August 1981.28 
Threshold structural and operational decisions regarding the 
implementation of DBS broadcast service will be equally influen-
tial upon future development. Although DBS assignments on an 
exclusive, or nearly exclusive, national basis would not preclude 
future transborder arrangements, international DBS service will 
be more readily realized if multilateral and regional reservations 
are provided for in the initial table of assignments. While early 
structural decisions are not unalterable, and the states in Regions 
I and III could eventually make arrangements for additional inter-
national broad.casting, reaching such subsequent international 
agreement may be difficult and cumbersome. Reservation of spec-
trum and orbital slots for international satellite channels in 
Region II, even if there presently existed only tentative institu-
26. Because the decreased spacing would cause some established stations to shift by 
up to 9 kHz (by an early Canadian proposal), or up to 4 kHz (by the American plan) while 
leaving others virtually unchanged, cost to each station would be determined by the dif-
ference between its old and its new assignments. BROADCASTING, June 15, 1981, at 71. 
27. In addition, domestic manufacturers supported the status quo, pointing out that 
German and Japanese manufacturers were already geared to produce technology based on 9 
kHz, creating a distinct disadvantage to American industry. Furthermore, some one million 
digitally-tuned receivers would be rendered totally obsolete, and a further four million 
would be impaired. BROADCASTING, July 27, 1981, at 29. 
Had the FCC membership remained constant, the question of a shift of 9 kHz spacing 
would probably still be viable; but a new, industry-oriented Commission joined with a new-
chaired NTIA to quash the proposal. Henry Geller was replaced at NTIA by Bernard J. 
Wunder, who favored retention of 10 kHz spacing; Geller had been a strong proponent of 
the change. Charles Ferris, another supporter of the proposal, was replaced at the FCC by 
Mark Fowler, a leader in the opposition to reassignment. The FCC added a new member 
shortly before the decision - Mimi Weyforth Dawson, who was also opposed to the change. 
A couple of members who had earlier supported the reallocation changed their minds; sup-
port for the status quo was also lent by State Department Under-Secretary for Security 
Assistance, Science and Technology, James L. Buckley. BROADCASTING, July 27, 1981, at 29. 
Many of the thirty nations in the region were reserving decision until the U.S. made 
its position known, so the FCC/broadcast industry decision was determinative for the entire 
region. 
28. Public Notic~. Mimeo No. 002651, August 5, 1981, 50 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 681. The 
issue was ultimately settled within the first three days of the November 1981 AM radio con-
ference in Rio de Janeiro; the United States, arguing that in fact the financial and technical 
costs of the proposed spacing change would outweigh the benefits, joined Mexico, Canada, 
Argentina, Brazil and others in support of the status quo. Consensus was forthcoming. 
BROADCASTING, Nov. 9, 1981, at 38. 
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tional arrangements to make use of the reserved resource, could 
avoid the difficulties and delicacies of later negotiation.29 
Countries which have been allocated national DBS 
assignments will assume vested interests in these orbital positions, 
frequencies, powers and beam patterns. Although these orbital 
assignments do not create a property interest in the assignee 
state, since the geostationary orbit is in outer space and therefore 
beyond sovereign appropriation,30 they do create a resource alloca-
tion and investment expectation so great that nonconsensual use 
of another state's slot would be universally sanctioned.31 Initial 
structural reservations for international DBS service will also pro-
vide the stimulus to develop the public and private institutional 
arrangements necessary for the operation of an international DBS 
system. Finally, such reservations will provide a more secure au-
dience base for the development of programming specifically 
29. Although rearrangement for international service might be made easier if, as 
some writers have suggested, national DBS assignments are made leasable in some form, 
such leasing arrangements could equally be used for national service o~ purposes. See 
Levine, Orbit and Spectrum Strategies, June 1981 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 102. The 
interests of cross-cultural communication would best be served by initial reservations of fre-
quency and orbit for international DBS services, regardless of the final decision as to the 
nature of rights in national assignments. See also, Regulating International Airwaves: The 
1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT'L. L. l, 42-52, (1980), discussing market allocation and other 
distributional possibilities, and A. DEVANY, R. ECKERT, c. MEYERS, D. O'HARA, & R. SCOTT, 
A PROPERTY SYSTEM APPROACH TO THE ELECTRONMAGNETIC SPECTRUM (1980). 
30. There is no question that outer space is beyond the sovereign claims of any state; 
this is settled in article one of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty]. 
There is a question, however, (at least to a small minority of states) whether the geostation-
ary orbit should be included in outer space. See, e.g., the Bogota Declaration, El Espectador 
(Bogota, Colombia), December 7, 1976, 13A (Trans.) Declaration of the First Meeting of 
Equatorial Countries, International Telecommunications Union Doc. W ARC-BS (1977) 81-E, 
17 January 1977, claiming equatorial state sovereignty over the geostationary orbital arc 
located above its land mass. The vast majority of states does include the geostationary orbit 
as a part of nonsovereign outer space. However, there continues to be substantial disagree-
ment as to the lower limit of outer space and the dividing line between outer and air space. 
Some have argued for a spatial or physical definition of outer space and division from air 
space, while others have urged a functional approach to accommodate advances of 
technology. The U.S. space shuttle, which both flies and orbits, has further complicated the 
question. See, e.g., Kopal, The Question of Defining Outer Space, 8 J. SPACE L. 154 (1981); 
Almond, Legal Definition of Outer Space, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST COLLOQUIUM 
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, IISL/IAF 77 (1978). 
31. See note 17, supra. The initial investments made by users of the geostationary or-
bit are much larger than those made by terrestrial broadcasters. Their tacit property in-
terests and their expectations will be concomitantly greater. See, e.g., Rice, supra note 11; 
FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 699-701, 709 n.19 (1979). 
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designed for cross-cultural education and entertainment, thus 
avoiding present and future problems associated with the exporta-
tion of programming produced solely for domestic audiences. 
In addition, there are many technical accommodations which 
must be considered for a viable international DBS system. The 
capabilities to exclude unwanted programming from the system, 
to provide foreign language sidebands on DBS video signals, and 
to delay broadcasts to account for time zone differentials all re-
quire technological coordination more easily accomplished in the 
formative stage of DBS technology.32 
32. Technological coordination is frequently accomplished by defining the new 
technology and classifying it within the existing mass communication structure. Coordina-
tion through classification has become increasingly difficult as new communication 
technology has blurred traditional distinctions. For example, the Communications Act of 
1934 was divided into two broad parts (common carriers and broadcasters) outlining very 
different regulatory schemes for the communication technologies then existing (telegraph, 
telephone, and AM radio broadcasting). The common carrier telegraph and telephone 
systems were to be regulated as public utilities and were to have no control over the con-
tent of the information transmitted over their facilities. Radio broadcasters, on the other 
hand, were not to be subject to profit regulation, and were to have control not only of the fre-
quency medium, but also of the messages transmitted. The tight technological distinction 
drawn in 1934 between common carriers (then only point-to-point transmitters by wire) and 
broadcasters (then only multi-point transmitters over the air) has been obliterated by new 
communication technologies and services. 
Cable television posed the first difficult classification problem for the FCC. Coaxial 
cable could perform individual services like common carriers, but could also disseminate 
mass communication like a broadcaster. Although the characterization of cable television 
technology as either common carrier or broadcaster (or some hybrid of the two) directly 
determines the extent to which the cable operator/owner has first amendment rights, and 
whether cable franchises can be issued to aliens, this question has not yet been finally decided 
by either the FCC, the Supreme Court or the Cong.ress. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 
440 U.S. 689, 709 n.19 (1979); Hagelin, The First Amendment Stake in the New Technology: 
The Broadcast-Cable Controversy, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 427, 497-99 (1975). DBS satellites pose 
a similar classification problem for the FCC. The current fixed service satellites (FSS) are 
regulated as common carriers. The Commission must determine whether DBS owners may 
also program as broadcasters, or whether they are limited to providing transponder time 
for hire as a common carrier. See Rice, supra note 11. The situation is further complicated 
by the breakdown of differentiation between fixed service satellites and direct broadcast 
satellites, a distinction incorporated into ITU rulings and spectrum allocation scheme. 
Canada has announced that it is experimenting with a service capable of providing both fixed 
and broadcast service from a single satellite; this development, if successful, would make 
the former distinction obsolete. See LeDuc, Transforming Principles into Policy, 30/2 J. 
COM. 196, 199-200 (1980). 
A hybridization of radio and television services has also developed. Radio and televi-
sion broadcasts, previously thought of as discrete, are now considered to be ends of a con-
tinuum of service with the spectrum space requirements bearing a direct relationship to the 
number of video frames broadcast per minute. By broadcasting a single picture frame for 
three minutes, with audio, the service would utilize only a radio band width, which is 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL ARRANGEMENTS 
FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DBS 
SERVICE 
Implementation of current U.S. DBS policy would require 
technological arrangements bypassing recipient state control of in-
formation links. One way in which this bypass could be accom-
plished would be to use domestic or otherwise unused geosta-
tionary assignments to beam into other countries.33 To the extent 
recipient states do not have advanced telecommunication tech-
nology, the opportunity for limitation of imported DBS program-
ming would depend upon recipient state control over compatible 
terrestrial receiving equipment. Future technological advances in 
satellite receiving equipment, coupled with the cost reductions 
due to economies of scale in mass production, will increasingly 
limit the feasibility of state regulation of imported DBS signals 
through control of terrestrial receiving equipment.34 
There are two technological arrangements by which to imple-
ment the Canadian-Swedish proposal, providing for the recipient 
state's exercise of prior consent and right of program participa-
tion. The international DBS programming could either be broad-
cast by two or more domestic satellites interconnected by inter-
satellite service links,35 or by a single satellite jointly controlled by 
roughly 1/10,000 of a television band width. Conventional television broadcasts sixty frames 
a second; the continuum covers this range. International organizations considering DBS ser-
vice will have to weigh the trade-off between the number of frames per minute transmitted 
by the satellite and the availability of spectrum space for additional satellites. 
33. A variation of this arrangement, which would also be consistent with U.S. DBS 
policy, would provide for communication with the recipient state government either by way 
of notification or of consultation prior to the transborder broadcast(s). The recipient states, 
however, would have no right to refuse the broadcast(s), and ultimately would be required 
to abide by the decision of the exporting state. Again, to make meaningful the paramount 
freedom of transborder communication would require technological arrangements by-
passing recipient state checkpoints in the communication links. The underlying technological 
arrangements would not differ greatly between a scheme of prior consultation/notification 
and a scheme of unlimited communication rights. 
34. A report of the Wroking Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites concluded: "Short 
of extreme measures, there appears to be no effective long term method of preventing the 
reception of unwelcome broadcasts - hence the desirability of international cooperation." 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 24 GAOR, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/117 
(1969). 
35. The inter-satellite service link consists of: 
the establishment of extremely high capacity radio communication links directly 
between satellites in orbit above the earth. Thus, for example, a domestic satellite 
serving U.S. customers can link up directly with a satellite serving European 
customers without going through either INTELSAT or submarine facilities. 
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states included within its signal contours or beam footprint.36 In 
essence, the choice is who controls the downlink of the DBS trans-
mission - the individual state or an international organization. In-
dividual state control of the downlink through use of domestic sat-
Rutkowski, The Inter-Satellite Service, July 1981TELECOMMUNICATIONS64 (emphasis added). 
This development obviously presents some difficult and interesting questions: who would 
establish or even register such service? What effect will the bypass of INTELSA T's ser-
vices have on that organization, and on U.S. participation in it? Policy effects can be ex-
pected to be thoroughgoing; while emphasis to date has been on reconciling differences, im-
plementation of inter-satellite service links would presumably necessitate the development 
of some basic and universal policies. Further, the question of which domestic satellite ser-
vices would be authorized to establish such links, and with whom, raises a plethora of policy 
and regulation concerns. Finally, the current domestic emphasis on deregulation and com-
petition may be pulled up short by the necessity for governmental interventions. 
Though intersatellite services links would not be appropriate to all nations' uses, 
those nations with developed or developing satellite broadcasting systems will surely be in-
terested in establishing such links, and will, as a prerequisite, grapple with these and 
similar concerns. "Perhaps the first petition to inaugurate the Inter-Satellite Service will 
give the U.S. international telecommunications policy-making process [like the policy pro-
cesses of other nations] a good test." Id. 
36. If the international service is to be accomplished by use of simultaneous multiple 
satellite broadcasts, bilateral relay and transmitting agreements will have to be reached, and 
there would still be a net inefficiency in the systems since multiple satellites would be used 
to accomplish what a single satellite could do. Id. 
However, there are clearly considerations beyond purely economic concerns which 
might prompt such development: 
Developing countries have compelling reasons to want access to the spec-
trum and communications technology. In the past decade, there have been many 
efforts to harness the power of communications technology for education and 
social programs: to upgrade the quality of instruction, to reach preschool and out-
of-school children, and to teach the basic survival skills in health, nutrition, and 
agriculture to adults, particularly those living in rural areas. 
Hart, supra note 12, at 34. Such concerns are shared by some developed countries as well-
Canada, the U.S.S.R. and Australia, for example, have significant populations in geographi-
cally isolated areas for whom radio communication is essential. 
Lesser developed countries (LDCs) have additional concerns, however, which are not 
reflected in developed nations, and: 
[t]he urgency of the need ... cannot be overemphasized. Even in the present state 
of affairs, radio has become a vital and important instrument for creating -national 
confidence and national pride and for projecting abroad the national point of view. 
Experience has shown that the full involvement of a people in the process of 
change and growth in developing countries cannot be achieved as well through any 
other means of mass communication as it can be through radio. Radio alone can 
reach the remotest of villages and the humblest of homes, and persuade the citizen 
to share in the vision and excitement of a country's development. 
Menon, Space Communication for Developing Countries: India as an Example, in UNESCO, 
COMMUNICATION IN THE SPACE AGE: THE USE OF SATELLITE BY THE MASS MEDIA 125 (1968). Of 
course recognition of this need poses numerous questions of funding and of sharing of tech-
nologies which cannot be dealt with here. See, e.g., the MacBride Report, infra note 49; 
Robinson, Regulating International Airwaves: The 1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. l, 37-42 
(1980). 
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ellites and inter-satellite service relays would provide recipient 
states with a greater capacity to exercise the right of prior con-
sent. Control of the downlink by an international organization 
places DBS programming beyond the direct contol of the recipient 
state, thus limiting a state's capacity to exclude programming to 
jamming of the satellite signal. Only those states having de-
veloped telecommunications technology could jam satellite signals, 
and such jamming is difficult, costly, and could entail serious deg-
radation of domestic service. Single satellite international service, 
therefore, would emphasize freedom of transborder communica-
tion at the expense of the recipient state's exercise of prior con-
sent. 
The greater the limitation upon the exercise of prior consent, 
the greater will be the demand for meaningful participation in pro-
gram production. For example, a bilateral arrangement for the ex-
change of programs via inter-satellite service links would not re-
quire deep involvement in the program production process, but 
would probably involve only pre-broadcast screenings of the pro-
gramming to determine whether to allow its carriage on the do-
mestic downlink. Bilateral program exchanges are therefore more 
likely to involve material produced primarily for domestic con-
sumption but incidentally appropriate or appealing to foreign 
state audiences. Recipient state concern over cultural dilution 
caused by imported foreign programming produced without its in-
volvement would be mitigated by the potential to control the 
downlink distribution. 
On the other hand, a multilateral arrangement to distribute 
programming via a single satellite would require far greater di-
rect involvement of states in the production process and more 
complex institutional interaction. Each state must feel secure in 
its opportunity to participate in the decision-making process and 
must be assured that its national interest and cultural heritage 
will be respected. Such an institution would require an equal 
voting scheme, independent of technological differences, and a 
unanimous commitment to the sharing of broadcast production and 
DBS distribution technology.37 Nothing short of these institutional 
procedures and purposes will compensate the individual recipient 
37. The development of this kind of agreement and commitment is without doubt 
more readily achieved regionally than globally; in fact, steps have already been taken in this 
direction. Probably the best example of regional communications cooperation is offered by 
the European Space Agency (ESA), formerly ESRO. ESA, formed in 1975 by ten signatory 
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state for its compromise of direct control over domestic down-
links. In a multilateral arrangement, it will be necessary to pro-
nations, now includes seventeen members as well as associates and observers. Its purpose is 
to provide, through international cooperation, every necessary phase of telecommunica-
tions, and with the recent successful ARIANE launches it has accomplished this. ESA coop-
erates fully with NASA, previously the sole source of its launches, in "non-continuous pro-
grams which have no military and little economic significance." N.M. MATTE, SPACE POLICY 
AND PROGAMMES TODAY AND TOMORROW 74 (1980). ESA's recent launching of four ARIANE 
satellites, and INTELSAT'S placing of an order for another launch in 1981, establishes its 
capacity for independence from the American agency. 
ESA has also cooperated in the joint French-West German venture Symphonie. The 
1975 launch of the Symphonie satellite by NASA allows bilateral management and program-
ming. Regional development in communications may mean anything from working out rules 
of access and use, to programming, management or launching-or all of these. 
Other examples of regional development exist. The Commonwealth Telecommunica-
tions Board, established in 1928, invited membership of Nigeria, Ghana and Malaya in 1961; 
many of the newly-independent African states have subsequently joined as well. This 
cooperation, coupled with the collaboration of ITU, the Economic Commission for Africa 
(ECA) and Organization for African Unity (OAU), has resulted in the formation of the Pan-
African Telecommunications Organization (PANAFTEL), which includes 38 member states 
and is developing regional satellite communications plans. ARABSAT, a consortium of 21 
Arab states, is actively engaged in satellite telecommunications, and is presently contract-
ing with ARIANE for launching and satellites and with the United States for telemetry. 
P ALAP A is the regional communications entity of Indonesia and the South Asian islands; 
Intersputnik's MOLYNIYA 2 is intended to link Eastern Europe, Cuba, Mongolia and the 
U.S.S.R. by satellite; and NORDSAT, the five-member Scandinavian entity, has cooperated 
in programming and management for years. In addition, the European Broadcasting Union, a 
non-governmental, non-administrative coordinating organization, provides an example of 
the cooperation and collaboration requisite to communications regional development. 
Regional development is desirable not only because it is more practicable than global 
efforts are likely to be, but also because it offers greater accountability of its members. In-
ternational law in general, and international organizations in particular, offer little in the 
way of enforcement; this is not the case with regional organizations. 
A regional tribunal could take prompt action to notify the manager of a satellite to 
disqualify a violating originator from continued use of the system. And where a 
state violated a regional plan through aggressive broadcasting by its own broad-
casdng system, sanctions could be taken against the state itself. These might in-
clude modification of the satellite beam to exclude coverage of the bulk of that na-
tion's receiving sets. 
Price, First Amendment Constraints and the Direct Broadcast Satellite Controversy, in 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITES: 
POLICIES AND PROBLEMS 35, 80 (1975). For further discussions of regional developments in 
communication, see MATTE, supra; Wigand, The Direct Satellite Connection: Definitions 
and Prospects, 30/2 J. COM. 140 (1980); Dickinson, Telecommunications Satellites and the 
European Broadcasting Union, in UNESCO, COMMUNICATION IN THE SPACE AGE 101 (1968); 
Elias, The Contribution of Telecommunications and Direct Satellite Broadcasting to 
Technical Assistance and Nation-Building in the "New" Countries: An African Viewpoint, 
in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATION 122 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971). Although hopes 
have been expressed in ITU conferences, the U.N. General Assembly, and elsewhere that 
global communications might be possible, the ongoing debates in UNESCO, the declarations 
made in Bogota and Talloires, and continuing discussions in other forums clearly 
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gram expressly for the international, cross-cultural audiences to 
be served.38 
The technological arrangements necessary to implement the 
U .S.S.R. policy of an absolute sovereign right of every state to ex-
clude unwanted broadcast programming would require a degree of 
international cooperation and consensus well beyond that required 
by the above schemes. Assurance of the sovereign right of prior 
consent could be achieved only by an international enforcement 
agency with the authority and capability to terminate the satellite 
source or intercept its signal, or by providing each and every state 
with the technological capacity to block offending programming.39 
The former alternative would require a detailed code and a com-
plex adjudicatory process whereby a state's plea for international 
agency protection against offending exporting countries could be 
judged. The latter alternative would require a rapid equalization 
of technological capacity beyond any reasonable possibility. 40 
demonstrate the difficulties involved in reaching world-wide agreement. Future 
developments and technologies may stimulate world-wide policy formation, but for the time 
being it is important to realize DBS's potential as fully as possible through its application in 
regional systems. 
38. Although, as discussed below, the multilateral scheme could accommodate 
domestic production of programming by public and private entities for international con-
sumption, these programs would, from conception through production, be designed for 
cross-cultural audiences. 
39. The termination or interception of offensive signals would be an arguably military 
response to freely broadcast programming, and is an outgrowth of the U.S.S.R.'s insistence 
that unwanted broadcasts are as surely a violation of national sovereignty as is a physical 
invasion. See U .S.S.R. Working Papers, supra note 6. The suggestion of forming an interna-
tional enforcement agency runs counter to the entire experience and history of international 
law and is, to understate, very unlikely. The closest modern history has come to such an en-
forcement agency is the use of United Nations military security forces pursuant to the U.N. 
Charter articles 42-47; such use has rarely been invoked, and then has often been held to be 
ineffective. The thought of a strict code enforced by an international agency is antithetical 
to the policies of negotiation and consensus which underlie international law. 
40. Equalizing the distribution of telecommunication technology and program produc-
tion capacity is also an important element of any arrangement built upon the Swedish-
Canadian proposal, but that scheme does not depend upon such a rapid and exact parity for 
operational viability. The assumptions one is prepared to make regarding technological de-
velopment can obviously play a determinative role in establishing one's point of view re-
garding implemention of one or another of these schemes. 
Although some question the operational and economic viability of DBS service, see 
Doyle, International Satellite Communications and the New Information Order: Distres-
sing Broadcasting Satellites, 8 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 365 (1981), history suggests that if 
one is to err in planning for new telecommunication services, the error should be on the side 
of more, rather than less, technological advancement. The development of the burgeoning 
field of informatics is a case in point. Informatics, roughly definable as the commingling of 
computer and communication technologies, is defined and introduced in the MacBride 
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V. PUBLIC AND/OR PRIVATE LICENSES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL DBS ASSIGNMENTS 
283 
International DBS assignments could be awarded to and 
operated by public entities, private entities, or both. Under the 
public model, rights in the license would be held by a consortium 
of states. Programming and operation of the service would be del-
egated to a subsidiary of the consortium. Although some program-
ming might be produced by this subsidiary, the subsidiary would 
more likely serve as a network feed of programming produced by 
Report, infra note 49, at 64-67. This field of endeavor, virtually non-existent a decade ago, 
calls forth variations of the same problems and concerns as have become familiar in other 
communications fields, e.g., DBS and remote sensing; economic, social and political issues 
are involved, and the paramount concern is the balancing of national insistence pn 
sovereignty and privacy with the desire for free exchange of information and ideas. In addi-
tion, the economic concerns regarding production and market development, voiced in other 
contexts primarily by LDCs, are in the context of informatics taken up by others: "The 
European nations' concern is economic, and their regulations have an ambivalent theme: 
both preserving privacy and reducing America's technological and business presence 
abroad." Olenick, Transnational Data Flow: Data Protection or Economic Protectionism?, 
in THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER 21, 23 (1979). 
. The sovereignty concerns are of a different nature in the field of transborder data flow 
(TDF) than in DBS, as they center on infringements of privacy and on dependence on (par-
ticularly, but not solely) the United States, rather than primarily on cultural "invasion". 
These concerns are nonetheless acute: "Information is power, and economic information is 
economic power .... [T]he ability to store and process certain types of data may well give 
one country political and technological advantages over other countries. This in turn leads 
to a loss of national sovereignty through supranational data flows." Louis Joinet, Secretary-
General of French Commission on Data Processing and Liberties, quoted in Pipe, National 
Policies, International Debates, 29 J. CoM. 115, 118 (1979). Not only may sovereignty be 
diminished through this process; its very nature and definition are modified. See, Gotlieb, 
Dalfen & Katz, The Transborder Transfer of Information by Communications and Com-
puter Systems: Issues and Approaches to Guiding Principles, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 227, 229 
(1974). 
In addition, the development of national systems of infomatics is seen as indispensable 
for other reasons: "The flow of technical information within nations and across national 
boundaries is a major resource for development. Access to such information, which coun-
tries need for technical decision-making at all levels, is as crucial as access to news sources." 
MacBride Report, infra note 49, at 260. Beyond the fear of not having access to necessary in-
formation, some nations also fear "that they will be unable to participate in the world 
political and economic community" unless they develop their own national infomatics 
schemes. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION FLOW: 
FORGING A NEW FRAMEWORK, H.R. REP. No. 96-1535, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980) [herein-
after cited as REPORT 1535). 
Such attitudes and concerns have, not surprisingly, resulted in the creation of signifi-
cant barriers to international information flow. Whether the problems of free TDF are seen 
as primarily trade-related in nature or less tangible:._ dealing with, for · example, national 
sovereignty, personal privacy, a clash of international institutions, or cultural im-
perialism-the result is an effective stopping of the flow, with resultant loss of information 
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domestic affiliated stations expressly for international consump-
tion. Decisions regarding which programs would or would not be 
carried by a public DBS service would be made by an equal voting 
process, in which each domestic affiliated station or state opted 
for the programming most appealing and appropriate to its audi-
ence. By this process, programming proposals having the broad-
est cross-cultural appeal would be funded, w bile programming 
proposals of interest to or appropriate for only narrow audiences 
would not.'1 
exchange, of trade, and of efficiency. REPORT 1535 supra, at 13, 25. Barriers may take 
various forms, from the imposition of tariffs to an absolute prohibition of non-domestic ser-
vices. Id. at 13. In addition, PTT anti-competitive policies and the threat of nationalization of 
facilities by LDC hosts discourage private investment and development. 
The need for international agreement is clear. Preliminary efforts have been made by 
the Council of Europe (CE) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), but both are limited-membership, non-representative organizations as far as 
various positions on TDF are concerned. The U.N. is an inappropriate forum because of its 
already crowded agenda and the practical impossibility of active participation by all in-
terested parties; the ITU has become too politicized to deal effectively with the intricacies 
of TDF. A partial answer may be the proposed formation of a consortium of LDCs, Eger, 
Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: Privacy Protection on Non-Tariff 
Trade Barriers? 10 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 1055, 1090 (1978), but surely the development of an 
international organization whose convention would dovetail with, or take precedence over, 
domestic laws is desirable and necessary. 
Parallel to the requirement for central government policies concerning com-
puter data bases is an increasing need for supra-national regulations governing the 
import and export of electronically transmitted data. Such codes of regulations in-
corporate technical standards including compatibility of systems, confidentiality 
and security of data stored and transmitted, and some normative dimensions as to 
the propriety of holding various sensitive information on individuals. 
Pipes, Data Base Development and International Dimension, in ORGANIZATION FOR 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) Doc. DAS/SPR/72-20 at 143. In addition 
to the guidelines discussed above, these international regulations would have to deal with 
the question of access by the subject individual or entity to information about himself or 
itself. See Gotlieb, Dalfen & Katz, supra, at 253-4. It might reasonably be assumed that a 
comprehensive international agreement would, while imposing relatively stringent 
guidelines, serve to stimulate TDF; Olenick, supra at 31. 
Informatics can be seen, then, as another forum demanding resolution of the tension, 
inherent in international telecommunications, "between the conflicting state interests in 
protecting, conserving, and controlling information on the one hand, and of importing, ex-
porting and exchanging ideas on the other- both in pursuit of state goals and in support of 
national policies." Gotlieb, Dalfen and Katz, supra, at 227. See also, OECD, GUIDELINES ON 
THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACIES AND TRANSBORDER BORDER DATA FLOWS (1981). 
41. This kind of "popularity poll" programming raises the problem of lowest-common-
denominator programming, already discussed in note 19 supra, and the fear that, in trying 
to appeal to everyone, the programming will be identifiable with no one. 
The public broadcasting system in the U.S. is an example of the application of this 
theory. Though funded 50% with federal money, according to the Public Broadcasting Act 
of 1967, it is a non-governmental, non-political entity meant to encourage excellence and 
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Equal voting, however, is only one condition necessary for the 
operation of a public DBS system. Of equal importance is equality 
of opportunity in programming production among the affiliated do-
mestic entities. 42 This would require financial and technological 
assistance in building modern studio facilities in countries without 
such facilities, and in training persons in film and video technique. 
The financial assistance could come from public subsidies appor-
tioned among the affiliated states on a progressive basis.43 Tech-
diversity through the development of "noncommercial education broadcast stations ... on a 
local, state, regional, and national basis." Public Broadcasting Act, 47 U.S.C. §396(g)(2)(G) 
(1976). The public system is designed to meet discrete and minority needs and interests; 
because of its public funding, it has a special duty to do so. Its "obligation includes not merely 
service to the general public but also service to significant, distinctive minority interests 
which are not and cannot be as fully served by commercial stations." Alabama Educational 
Television Commission, 50 F.C.C.2d 461, 472 (1975). Because of the system's need to garner 
popular support to achieve the remainder of its funding without abandoning its noncommer-
cial status as federal spending on PBS is increasingly restricted, it has had to increase its 
appeal for private donations. These donations are obviously made on the basis of approval of 
programming; as a result, the system which was designed to respond to minority needs has 
been accused by some of being a government subsidy of the upper middle class. See further 
discussion at note 113, infra. Programming on PBS "should address itself to the ideal of ex-
cellence, not the idea of acceptability .... Once in a while it does, and you get a quick glimp-
se of its potential." Letter from E.B. White to the Carnegie Commission, quoted in D. 
GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING: LAW AND POLICY TOWARDS RADIO, TELEVISION AND 
CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 635 (1979). See generally A PUBLIC TRUST: THE REPORT OF THE 
CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING (1979). 
On the other hand, national network television has been credited by some as a unifier, 
via provision of a common base-line of experience, of the diverse and separated cultures 
within the U.S.; international direct broadcasting could serve a similar function, and offer 
unparalleled opportunities for increased cross-cultural understanding and sharing. See note 
48, infra. 
42. The question of equal opportunity in domestic law has spawned various inter-
pretations: Does equal opportunity mean simply refraining from erecting barriers to ac-
complishment, or does it involve a more active response in the form of remediation of those 
formerly deprived? In civil rights law, at least, equality of result rather than simply of op-
portunity has become the aim. This interpretation involves greater individual and social 
costs, but is more likely to bring about the needed changes. 
43. A tension exists in international public organizations between inequality of invest-
ment or contribution and equality of voting or control. Organizations concerned directly 
with finance and credit, such as the International Monetary Fund, are operated on weighted 
voting schemes reflecting the disproportionate investment of member states. Organizations 
concerned with ministerial functions, such as the ITU, have adopted equal voting schemes 
without regard to size or state of technological development. U.S. participation in an inter-
national DBS consortium would not be for a direct, immediately measurable return on 
capital. Rather the benefits to the U.S. would come from longer term expansion of new 
markets and from a more open exchange of ideas throughout the world. See, e.g., Christo}, 
The International Telecommunications Union and the International Law of Outer Space, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, IISL/IAF 35 
(1979); Snow, INTELSAT: An International Example, 30 J. COM. 147 (1980). 
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nological assistance could come through the open sharing within 
the consortium of know-how and experience. The training could be 
accomplished either through establishment of international uni-
versities for the study of telecommunications, or through scholar-
ship programs in which students could attend universities in those 
countries having telecommunications specialities.44 
The private model would require establishment of an interna-
tional authority and development of general standards and proce-
dures for comparing competing applicants and evaluating license 
renewals. At a minimum, these standards would look to the pro-
gramming proposed and/or presented by each applicant, the appli-
cant's familiarity with the audience, and the applicant's ownership 
composition. Applicants proposing quality programming of demon-
strated cross-cultural appeal, who sought to learn about the 
peoples served and to respond to their needs, would be preferred. 
Similarly, applicants having an ownership structure reflective of 
the countries served, and employing citizens of these countries in 
management and staff positions, would also be preferred, as they 
would be more likely to provide satisfactory service thap ap-
plicants owned and operated by corporations and citizens of any 
one country.45 The procedure adopted by an international licensing 
A similar conflict of interests arose within INTELSAT between owners and users of 
the INTELSAT system. States having an ownership interest in excess of their percentage 
usage of the system tended to favor higher rates of return on their investment. States using 
the system to a greater extent than was reflected in their proportionate ownership tended 
to favor lower usage rates and lower rates of return on their investments. This conflict has 
been resolved by periodic adjustments of the permissible ownership allotments to reflect 
percentage changes in the use of the INTELSAT system. Colino, International Cooperation 
Between Communications Satellite Systems: An Overview of Current Practices and 
Future Prospects, 5 J. SPACE L. 65, 92 (1977). 
44. Although it is difficult to predict precisely the programming such a public DBS 
system would yield, or to anticipate the quality and creativity these opportunities might 
unleash, some speculation about the general types of programming which would be provided 
is possible. The programming should avoid propagandizing; when a politically slanted state-
ment or presentation is made, opportunity should be given to present other views as well. 
(The New World Information Order's "balanced flow" insists on this, as does the U.S. 
fairness doctrine). The programming should not, directly or indirectly, attempt to persuade 
anyone of the rightness or wrongness of given political principles; rather, it should make 
available quantities of information from many and diverse sources, allowing recipients to 
learn and to make informed choices. The programming should seek to educate people about 
the places and people around them, and about the commonality of human experience. News 
events, sports, films, national festivals and celebrations, concerts, plays, natural and social 
science research, and travel/adventure logs seem likely prospects for international DBS pro-
gramming. 
45. The FCC's license evaluation and ascertainment processes are reflected in these 
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authority should afford every applicant a full and fair considera-
tion of its application and an opportunity to present firsthand the 
merits of its proposed programming or past service.46 These pro-
cedures should also afford representatives of the international au-
dience the opportunity for input into the licensing process.47 
A hybrid model would include both public and private DBS 
systems, and would make possible the realization of the inherent 
advantages of each.48 
remarks. "Ascertainment" refers to the licensee's duty to ascertain the needs of the service 
population, and to respond to them. See note 104, infra and accompanying text. Local 
ownership structure, reflective of the service area, and integration of ownership and 
management have been a controlling factor in FCC licensing proceedings. See notes 139 and 
140, infra. These guidelines are established in the name of the Communications Act's man-
date of service for the public interest, convenience and necessity. 
46. See, e.g., Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). Cf. Policy Statement 
Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 
(1970), rev'd sub nom. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). In an effort to expedite the licensing process, Congress has recently authorized the 
Commission to employ a random selection process, but one which will ensure that groups 
which are now insufficiently represented in ownership of broadcast facilities will be given 
significant preferences. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35 
§1242(3)(A), 95 Stat. 736-37 (1981). It remains to be seen whether a random system will 
simplify licensing. 
47. Domestically, audience members have standing to participate in the licensing 
process; this was firmly established in United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966), where then Circuit Judge Burger wrote: 
Since the concept of standing is a practical and functional one designed to in-
sure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can participate in a 
proceeding, we can see no reason to exclude those with such an obvious and acute 
concern as the listening audience. This much seems essential to insure that the 
holders of broadcating licenses be responsive to the needs of the audience, without 
which the broadcaster could not exist. 
Id. at 1002. Judge Burger chided the broadcast industry for failing to grasp, even after fifty 
years of operation, "the simple fact that a broadcast license is a public trust subject toter-
mination for breach of duty," id. at 1003, and says that the Commission can avoid the "clog-
ging" of its dockets by a "host of parties" through efficient administration and application of 
guidelines. 
The need sought to be met is to provide a means for reflection of listener ap-
praisal of a licensee's performance as the performance .meets or fails to meet the 
licensee's statutory obligation to operate the facility in the public interest .... 
[I]ntervention on behalf of the public is not allowed to press private interests but 
only to vindicate the broad public interest relating to a licensee's performance of 
the public trust inherent in every license. 
Id. at 1006. 
48. Private commercial systems afford the advantages of costless service and greater 
independence from government, but most appeal to broad, homogeneous cross-sections of 
the society to be financially viable. Public systems, not dependent upon mass appeal for 
revenue, afford the advantages of greater program selectivity and diversity, but at the risk 
of domination by the government or by interest groups influential in the government. See 
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VL PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION AFFECTING U.S. 
DBS POLICY 
U.S. satellite and television program production technology 
are unrivaled. The U.S. is today the largest exporter of satellite 
equipment and broadcast programming in the world. 49 Few nations 
have satellite technology, and many have only rudimentary terres-
trial telephone and/or broadcast systems.5° Clearly, the U.S. would 
enjoy a wide advantage in the free flow of transborder communi-
cation by DBS were an open skies access scheme now adopted. 
However, this advantage may come at the sacrifice of other U.S. 
interests at home and abroad. It must be remembered that al-
though few nations today have satellite technology, those indus-
trialized countries which do are making rapid advances in 
research and development and may soon rival the U.S. for the sat-
ellite export market. Industrialized countries are already com-
petitive with the U.S. in the export of broadcast production tech-
nology and are gaining in the export of broadcast program 
material.51 
If it is in the best economic interest of the U.S. to expand ex-
port markets for DBS technology and related production equip-
ment, the U.S. must ask whether such market expansion will more 
note 41, supra. Public systems must also maintain a far greater degree of political neutrality 
than private systems. 
Some are skeptical as to whether a sufficiently viable economic base exists to warrant 
private investment in international DBS programming; see remarks of Harry Olsson 
reported in Friendly, The Control of Program Content in International Telecommunica-
tions: A Discussion of General Principles, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L . 40, 61 (1974). Reser-
vation of international DBS assignments would greatly increase economic viability for 
private investment. See text accompanying note 31, supra. Mass audiences have an inherent 
commercial value to mass producers of goods and services. Each generation of new mass 
telecommunication technology in the U.S. has resulted in new marketing opportunities. 
Tourism, air transportation, banking and investment industries may find international DBS 
audiences especially attractive. 
49. UNESCO, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROB-
LEMS, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD: COMMUNICATION AND SOCIETY TODAY AND TOMORROW, 
108-09 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MACBRIDE REPORT]. 
50. Id. at 123-34. 
51. In satellite technology, Japan, West Germany, France and the Netherlands are 
producing sophisticated equipment and can successfully compete with the U.S. in a world 
market. In programming, Britain and Canada have developed export systems, and regional 
groups such as NORDSAT develop their own programming which, it might be expected, 
may be exported in the future. If film production is a valid indicator, the U.S. can expect 
heavy competition from Italy, France, Britain, India and the U.S.S.R., as well as others. See 
generally BROADCASTING YEARBOOK (1980-1981). 
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likely occur through cooperation with an international DBS organi-
zation or through unilateral U.S. action. The U.S. must also con-
sider whether developing countries entering the DBS market will 
purchase from the U.S. if the U.S. pursues a policy of unilatera-
lism, or whether they will turn to industrialized countries which 
are cooperating in international institutional arrangements and 
have thus embraced DBS policy positions more closely in line with 
their own. 
U.S. leadership in the development of international fixed 
satellite service (FSS) through its investment in and assistance to 
INTELSAT provides a remarkable contrast to its stance on DBS.52 
52. INTELSAT was established in 1964 by the eleven nations signing the Agreement 
Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite 
System, Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.l.A.S. No. 5646. Open to all ITU members (present-
ly 154 nations), INTELSAT currently consists of 106 member states. INTELSAT is 
organized in two segments: the space segment, including satellites, telemetry, and so on, 
owned and operated by the international consortium itself; and the ground segment, con-
sisting of earth stations individually owned and operated by the telecommunications en-
tities of the nations in which they are located. See the COMSAT Study, 77 F.C.C.2d 564, 
589-90 (1980). 
Although it has been criticized as non-universal (since it includes, for example, none 
of the Soviet bloc countries) and as overly westernized, and weighted to remain so, see 
Kopal, East-West Cooperation in Space Telecommunications: A Socialist Countries' View-
point [sic] in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 99, 102-03 (E. McWhinney ed. 
1971), INTELSAT is interesting in several regards. Voting was originally based on invest-
ment shares, and has recently been modified to reflect utilization of services as well. 
Futhermore, INTELSAT regulates itself, unlike U.S. domestic communications entities, 
which are subject to federal regulation. Finally, while INTELSAT is similar to other inter-
national organizations in that it is composed of governmental representatives and uses a 
treaty or agreement as the basis of its self-regulation, it is completely unlike others in that 
it "is the only such organization that involves the operation of an enterprise along commer-
cial lines." Snow, supra note 43, at 149. Each member is not only an owner, but also a user. 
INTELSAT's commercial basis posits many interesting questions and concerns; for one 
thing, commercial operation clearly precludes the provision of services to LDC gratis or at 
reduced rates, since such a decision would be justifiable only on a political, not a profit-
making, basis. INTELSA T's primary goal is "efficient provision, technologically and 
economically, of world-wide satellite communications." Id. at 155. "[T]he United States took 
the initiative in laying the institutional groundwork for an organization to provide ... public 
telecommunications by satellite between the United States and other countries." Id. at 148. 
When INTELSAT was formed in 1964, see note 43, supra, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were 
the only nations with satellite communications potential; for political reasons the two did 
not communicate. The U.S., in helping to form INTELSAT, contributed technological exper-
tise as well as more than half of the initial investment costs. Id. 
U.S. dominance of INTELSAT in these early stages was unassailable: "Space segment 
procurement was from United States manufacturing concerns and launch services were 
from NASA." COMSAT Study, supra, at 591. U.S. ownership (53%) and management of IN-
TELSAT were determinative of the latter's early development; the U.S. representative to 
INTELSAT, COMSAT, retained its position as Manager of INTELSAT for the first nine 
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U.S. policy on FSS has consistently emphasized international coop-
eration; the result has been rapid development of efficient interna-
tional FSS service at decreasing cost. The extent to which U.S. 
policy on FSS has led to an expansion of the FSS export market 
and has enabled the U.S. to acquire a major share of this market 
must be considered in the formulation of U.S. DBS policy. U.S. uni-
lateralism with respect to DBS service could result in a stultifica-
tion of international development and loss of U.S. export oppor-
tunities.53 
The U.S. free flow policy may also disserve domestic econo-
mic interests in a stable DBS industry and pose costly and trouble-
some administrative problems. Many applications have been sub-
mitted to the FCC for authority to provide domestic DBS broad-
cast service.54 The FCC, in reviewing these applications, must 
carefully consider the economic impact upon the national broad-
cast networks, local affiliate stations, program producers and dis-
tributors, and of course, the American public. After reaching a 
decision on the structure of the domestic DBS industry (a process 
that may take many years and involve complex cost-benefit analy-
years of the organization, and accordingly shaped INTELSA T's policies and practices to a 
great degree. Throughout this period of early development, U.S. policy consistently em-
phasized and encouraged technological growth and expansion of services. Though the U.S. 
role has diminished considerably, in accession to the 1973 final agreements of INTELSAT, 
its emphasis on cooperation and development continues. Snow, supra, note 43, at 148. 
INTELSAT's extraordinary progress in the field of telecommunications 
satellites in recent years, combining high scientific advances with unexpectedly 
low financial costs, has been largely the product of United States technological and 
managerial skill. Without this distinctively American contribution it would be 
hardly possible to talk seriously today about achieving a global system to telecom-
munications satellites. 
McWhinney, The Development of an International Law of Communications, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 11, 14 (E. McWhinney ed. 1971). 
53. See generally McWhinney, supra note 52; Chayes, Unilateralism in U.S. Satellite 
Communications Policy, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMUNICATIONS 42 (E. McWhinney 
ed. 1971). 
54. See Inquiry into the Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Interim 
Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,124 (1981). Among the fourteen parties 
with applications on file are several seeking to provide free or pay television directly to the 
home (for example, COMSAT's Satellite Television Corporation (STC)), several proposing to 
feed satellite signals to television stations for broadcast into the home (for example, Hub-
bard Broadcasting's United States Satellite Broadcasting Company), and a few offering to pro-
vide high resolution television services (for example, CBS), BROADCASTING, July 6, 1981at11. 
The varied service sought to be provided by DBS operators will further complicate the 
problem of classifying DBS technology within the established communication system. See 
discussion at note 32, supra. 
26
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1981], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol8/iss2/2
1981] Prior Consent 291 
sis and careful balancing of social and economic interests), could 
the FCC then ignore a foreign satellite service blanketing the 
U.S.? The spector of pirate satellites, broadcasting without regard 
to consequences to domestic media, may become as threatening to 
the U.S. as it now is to other countries. 55 As DBS technology 
spreads among the nations of the world (which it is likely to do at a 
much more rapid pace than has been the case for other technolo-
gies), it will become increasingly difficult for the U.S. to abide its 
free flow policy. 
55. The problem of pirate radio broadcasts has plagued several nations over the past 
half century. Pirate broadcasts are unsolicited, undesirable, and apparently invulnerable to 
attempts at regulation or termination. "The pirate broadcaster is one who transmits into 
the territory of a nation from beyond that nation's territorial boundaries and without its 
authorization." Smith, Pirate Broadcasting, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 769, 770 (1968). (One wonders 
whether this definition necessarily includes broadcasts proposed under the U.S. free flow 
policy). 
Pirate broadcasts are objectionable for several reasons: they often subvert domestic 
broadcast policy (e.g., against advertising); they may interfere with established spectrum 
allocation for other AM or FM radio uses and marine or emergency bands; they may cause 
economic harm to domestic broadcasters; they may pose problems of tax evasion and copy-
right infringement; they may create undesirable commercial pressures in the target coun-
try; and finally, pirate broadcasts may be morally and/or culturally offensive or objec-
tionable. "At stake is more than a system of national communication, because broadcasting 
also has the vitally important task of identifying and strengthening cultural entities, 
regional entities and community loyalties." Canadian Radio Television Commission, In-
tergration of Cable Television in tke Canadian Broadcast System (1971). 
The United Kingdom is among those nations targeted; the unregistered ship Caroline 
has broadcast from international waters off the English coast more or less continuously 
since the 1930s, and continues to do so today, BROADCASTING, Sept. 1981, despite passage 
and enforcement of the Act to Suppress Broadcasting from Ships or Aircraft and Certain 
Marine Structures (Marine Offences Act of 1967). France has also faced unwelcome broad-
casting from Radio Europe I, owned by Frenchmen and broadcasting from the German Saar 
region. 
Various efforts have been made, domestically (as stated above) and internationally, to 
eliminate this problem: the ITU's Radio Regulations art. 7, no. 28 ,1 prohibits pirate broad-
casting; the Council of Europe has classified such activities as illegal, as have the Ad-
ministrative Council of the European Broadcasting Union and the International Broad-
casting Union. The major problems center on questions of jurisdiction-especially if the 
broadcasts are initiated on the high seas-and enforcement. Neither question has been set-
tled by international law, though the European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10, the 
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, and the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone have all been brought into consideration. In addition, customary inter-
national law, at least according to some sources, allows any nation to assert jurisdiction 
over one in flagrant violation of international law. 
No real resolution, and no practicable solution, has yet been reached on the question 
of broadcast piracy. It may be assumed, however, that as direct broadcasting from satellites 
becomes the norm, piracy will be more and more broadly practiced, and the need for resolu-
tion more pressing. See generally, Smith, supra; Hunnings, Pirate Broadcasting in Euro-
pean Waters, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 410 (1965); Price, supra note 37, at 44-48. 
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U.S. exportation of DBS broadcast programming also poses 
practical problems. It is doubtful whether a U.S. free flow policy 
would be construed to allow international DBS broadcasters oper-
ating from within the U.S. to go unregulated, unlike their do-
mestic counterparts. More likely would be the use of some type of 
licensing scheme, along the lines of current domestic practice. If a 
DBS broadcaster must obtain an FCC license to transmit interna-
tionally, how is the licensee's performance during the license term 
to be judged? Would the FCC refuse to consider programming ex-
ported to foreign audiences? If foreign programming services 
were unilaterally reviewed, what standards should the Commis-
sion apply? And should foreign citizens receiving exported U.S. 
programming have the same standing to contest DBS license renew-
als as U.S. citizens have to contest terrestrial license renewals?56 
Finally, the U.S. free flow policy may entail political costs and 
may disserve U.S. foreign relations. Developing nations forced to 
choose between U.S. and U .S.S.R. policy leads on DBS may be 
pressed to accept code restrictions as a protection against the 
threat of foreign DBS programming. In its present form, the pro-
posed U .S.S.R. code applies to all DBS transmissions, including na-
tional as well as international ~ervice.57 In addition, the definition 
of DBS service adopted by the ITU includes both transmission di-
rect to homes and transmission to community reception points for 
terrestrial relay to homes. 58 Should the present code proposal be 
adopted, arguably it would apply to purely domestic DBS service 
and to terrestrial communication links. Such an argument could be 
used to legitimize outside control of or influence upon domestic 
communication policy through economic and political coercion.59 
56. See discussion of standing, supra note 47. In practice, therefore, U.S. free flow 
policy would argue for the unfettered freedom to communicate, internationally, program-
ming which is subject to domestic regulatory review. This contradiction would be directly 
attributable to the inconsistency between U.S. domestic and international communications 
policies. See remarks of Abram Chayes reprinted in Friendly, The Control of Program Con-
tent, supra note 48, at 40-67. 
57. The U.S.S.R. proposal seeks to "elaborate principles governing the use by states 
of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting with a view to concluding an 
international agreement," U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/117, Annex III (1972), without distinguishing 
national from international broadcasting. 
58. 1976 Edition, Radio Regulations, vol. 1, ITU, Geneva. DBS is defined as a satellite 
transmitter of "signals [which] are intended for direct reception by the general public." 
"Direct reception" is then defined as including both "individual reception" and "community 
reception." 
59. An attempt by one state, through military, economic and/or political coercion, to 
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Just as U.S. insistence upon the absolute right of communication 
may result in less international communication, the U .S.S.R. in-
sistence upon the absolute right of sovereign prior consent could 
result in reduced sovereign control of domestic communication. 
The U.S. free flow position further exacerbates the plight of 
developing nations by failing to provide policy alternatives more 
consistent with their present needs and social and cultural tradi-
tions. Many developing nations may well be unwilling or unable to 
adopt a free flow policy domestically. Should these developing 
countries seek some consistency between their international and 
domestic communication policies, and should they be forced to 
choose between free flow and code restrictions, they might opt for 
a code for lack of a more suitable model. 
Politically, the critical question is not how much communica-
tion freedom ought ideally to be protected, but how much can be 
protected in light of popular intolerance. For mass communication, 
domestic or international, to exist there must be popularly ac-
cepted limitations upon the right to communicate.60 The failure to 
appreciate these political realities in the formulation of U.S. DBS 
policy could cost the U.S. its leadership position in advancing open 
communication policies throughout the world. 
VIL CONSIDERATION OF U.S. DBS POLICY IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXTS 
Although detailed international agreements and fully devel-
oped institutional arrangements are not preconditions to the res-
determine communication policies of another state should be of major concern to the U.S. 
Any agreement by the U.S. to a prior consent principle for satellite television broadcasting 
should be sharply distinguished from U.S. policy against interference by one state in the 
communication affairs of another, a violation of international law and national sovereignty 
which is forbidden in the U.N. Charter, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 4, 7, and indeed by jus 
cogens. A principal basis of the prior consent principle is the state's sovereign right to con-
trol information flowing within its borders. Although agreement by the U.S. to a prior con-
sent principle would imply affirmation of the independent right of every state to determine 
for itself its internal and international communication policies, on an issue of this 
magnitude, the U.S. should seek to avoid misunderstandings through adoption of express 
clarifying language. As part of a prior consent convention, such language could strongly af-
firm the svvereign right of every state to determine freely its telecommunication policy 
without coercion by any other state. Such clarifying language might not have much practical 
effect on states already subject to foreign control of, or influence upon, their communication 
channels, but it could well focus attention on the critical distinction between prior consent 
and state communication sovereignty. 
60. See Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949). Professor Chafee, defend-
ing the clear and present danger test then used by the S~preme Court, suggested that the 
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ervation of international DBS assignments, such reservations de-
pend, preliminarily, on the prospect of some minimal accomodation 
of policy among the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Until 
common principles are recognized among states in the Americas, 
international structural reservations and the benefits of the full 
communication potential of DBS technology cannot be realized. If 
such accommodation is to be achieved, the U.S. must inevitably 
play a major role. 
The U.S., however, has deep misgivings regarding modifica-
tion of its international free flow position. There is, first, concern 
that modification of the absolute right to receive and transmit in-
formation regardless of means and frontiers might be perceived, 
or publicized, as a compromise by the U.S. of its general human 
rights principles. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights61 secures for every person the right to obtain informa-
tion and to form opinions freely. No nation has more aggressively 
advanced the individual's right to know, domestically and interna-
tionally, than the U.S. The fear is that should the U.S. cooperate 
with some international institution having the powers of program-
ming review and sanctions -an institution likely to include nations 
not having communication freedom62 -this cooperation might be 
interpreted as endorsing or acquiescing to government control 
and censorship. Can U.S. international communications policy 
draw a principled distinction between participation in DBS pro-
gram controls and commitment to the individual right to obtain 
and impart information? 
The corollary of the individual right to obtain and impart in-
pursuit of an absolute immunity for public discussion might result in popular pressure for 
legislation and, ultimately, no immunity. A similar phenomenon could occur internationally. 
61. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, 
U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948) states: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
See also, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975 [Helsinki Accord], reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 1292, 1315 (1975). Cf., International Telecommunication Convention, Dec. 22, 
1952, arts. 29, 30, 6 U.S.T. 1213, T.l.A.S. No. 3266, establishing the right of a state to halt 
transmission of a private telegram, or to suspend indefinitely any international telecom-
munication service, which appears dangerous to security or public decency. 
62. A recent world press survey indicated t!tat less than one quarter of the nations of 
the world have a "free press". MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 19. 
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formation is the individual right to privacy, and the right to be 
free from unwanted communications. If this right can be realized 
only through the mechanism of government,63 the antagonism be-
tween content controls and human rights breaks down; the issue 
then is cast not in terms of the right of government to control in-
formation coming within its borders, but rather in terms of the 
right of the individual to be free from unwanted communication in-
trusion. Such a right of privacy has been recognized in U.S. broad-
cast law in a number of contexts, with courts relying upon the ubi-
quitous nature of radio and television programming and its entry 
into the home to support restrictions on programming content.64 In 
a recent case dealing with the broadcast of indecent language,65 
the Supreme Court likened the broadcast material to a "nuisance," 
subject to regulation like air pollution, and strongly affirmed the 
individual right to be free of obnoxious and offensive broadcasts. 
If this personal privacy right established in domestic communica-
tion law is to be recognized in international policy, the U.S. must 
agree to some controls upon the flow of transborder communica-
tion. U.S. policy on international DBS broadcasting should respect 
personal privacy rights, as well as advance the principle of 
freedom of communication.66 
63. American communications law evidences a belief that this is true; cases have af-
firmed the authority, and even the duty, of the legislative and administrative bodies to in-
tervene to safeguard personal privacy. The argument that listeners and viewers can turn 
off their receiving sets to void unwanted and obnoxious communications coming into their 
homes has not proven persuasive. See discussion at note 74, infra. 
64. See, e.g., Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 
1975); Notice to Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 57 F.C.C.2d 783 (1975); Robin-
son v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964); KFKB Broadcasting 
Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931). 
65. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
66. The Supreme Court has also upheld against first amendment attack the use of zon-
ing ordinances to regulate the places at which sexually explicit magazines, books and 
movies can be distributed. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), The Supreme 
Court established guidelines on government restrictions which infringe upon first amend-
ment rights. In 0 'Brien, the Court said such restrictions were permissible if (i) the regula-
tion lay within the constitutional power of the government and furthered a substantial 
government interest, (ii) that interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression, 
and (iii) the restriction of free expression was no greater than was necessary to promote the 
government interest. 391 U.S. at 377. 
In a 5-4 decision the court held in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 
(1976), that restrictive zoning of adult bookstores did not violate first amendment freedoms 
so long as the restricting ordinance defined clearly what characteristics were to be con-
sidered and so long as alternative access to the market remained available. The govern-
ment's concern for the public health and safety, Bayou Landing, Ltd. v. Watts, 563 F.2d 
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The U.S. is also concerned that acquiescence to proposed con-
trols on DBS not compromise international press freedom. U.S. 
DBS policy has been influenced by developments affecting other 
international communications media. UNESCO's consideration of 
licensing news journalists67 and of monitoring news and wire ser-
vice for balance and distortion68 has met with strong resistance in 
the U.S.69 as well as in other nations committed to a free and 
pluralistic exchange of expression.70 Taken in the context of the 
U.S. record on past matters of the UNESCO agenda, the U.S. is 
understandably apprehensive that any compromise of the free 
flow principles on DBS might weaken its position of resistance to 
controls on .other communication media.71 
Participation by the U.S. in an agency responsible for interna-
tionally broadcast satellite programming, however, can be disting-
1172 (5th Cir. 1977), and its paramount interest in protecting, preserving and improving the 
character and quality of residential neighborhoods, Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 
90 Wash. 2d 709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978), justify such zoning. These restrictions, within these 
guidelines, are not an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech. See Metropolitan 
Board of Zoning Appeals v. Zaphiriou, __ Ind. App. __ , 376 N.E. 2d 110 (1978). 
67. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1978, at A12, col. 5. 
68. The proposal finds its basis in UNESCO's General Conference Declaration of Mass 
Media (Nov. 22, 1978). Article X states: "2. It is important that free flow and wider and better 
balanced dissemination of information be encouraged." Both the licensing of journalists and 
the monitoring of news services are discussed in the MacBride Report, note 49 supra, and 
are supported by many of the proponents of a New World Information Order. 
69. U.S. response has been uniformly and strongly negative. It has taken the form of 
threats of withdrawal from UNESCO (mentioned though not endorsed by Assistant 
Secretary of State Elliott Abrams) and of a House Resolution, R.R. Res. 142, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H2316 (1981), calling on UNESCO to "cease efforts to attempt to 
regulate news content." 
70. "The Declaration of Tallories" was formulated and signed in Tallories, France in 
May 1981 by representatives of 100 print and broadcast organizations from twenty nations, 
including the U.S. It is a strong demand to UNESCO that attempts to formulate press rules 
and to regulate news content be halted in the name of international press freedom, which 
the Declaration terms "a basic human right." It finds domestic support in R.R. Cong. Res. 
137, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H2329 (1981). 
71. The U.S. often finds itself unable to acquiesce in UNESCO's pronouncements be-
cause of concern over infringements of the U.S. Constitution or Bill of Rights. For example, 
though the U.S. is surely one of the freest members of UNESCO, it has been reluctant or 
unable to ratify such agreements as those dealing with civil and political rights, Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 61, and with human rights, Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, id. Furthermore, the U.S., with its tradition of and in-
sistence upon individual freedoms, is often pitted against UNESCO's and the General 
Assembly's new majority, which demands satisfaction of social needs; the U.S. serves as a 
rallying point for the democracies. Theberge, UNESCO's "New World Information Order':· 
Colliding with First Amendment Values, 67 A.B.A.J. 714 (1981) expresses cogently the 
fears of many in the U.S. that there may be no way to reconcile the demands for a New 
World Information Order with the democratic traditions and principles of a free press. 
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uished from support for similar regulatory measures with respect 
to other communications functions. U.S. communication law has 
sharply distinguished the gathering of news, electronic transmis-
sions from point-to-point, and print dissemination, from broadcast 
dissemination. The radio spectrum has always been treated as a 
scarce natural resource far less accessible to the average person 
than other mass media.72 And although great advances in elec-
tronic mass communication technology have caused some toques-
tion the accuracy of this assumption (especially as compared to 
daily newspapers), the distinctions between the print and broad-
cast media and between broadcast and point-to-point transmission 
persist. The well-defined and widely disparate domestic treatment 
of the broadcaster, newspaper publisher, news gatherer, and 
point-to-point common carrier would provide firm support for a 
similar distinction internationally between the DBS broadcaster, 
newspaper publisher, news journalist, and wire service.73 
72. Justice Frankfurter wrote in 1943 that it was important to remember 
certain basic facts about radio as a means of communication-its facilities are 
limited; they are not available to all who may wish to use them; the radio spec-
trum simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody. There is a fixed 
natural limitation upon the number of stations that can operate without interfer-
ing with one another. 
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943) (footnote omitted). 
Although domestic broadcast regulation has recently been relaxed to reflect the lessening 
of scarcity of terrestrial outlets, scarcity will continue to mark DBS technology for the fore-
seeable future. See notes 3 and 15, supra. 
73. Although vigorous debate continues over the rationale for, and wisdom of, the 
electronic/print first amendment dichotomy, differential treatment of these two media, 
deriving ultimately from the public interest obligation imposed on all broadcast licensees by 
the Communications Act, is firmly established. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Video 
Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972). Broadcast stations are licensed, newspapers are not. Broad-
casters are required to be fair and balanced in their coverage of controversial issues; 
newspapers are not. Broadcasters must afford access to persons attacked; newspapers need 
not. Sex, violence and indecent material can be banned from broadcasting, but not from 
books. 
The lines of conflict are drawn between the publisher/broadcaster's freedom to com-
municate and the public's right to know (or to exclude). Limitations on the broadcaster's 
freedom to communicate have regularly been upheld against first amendment challenge by 
the Supreme Court and other federal courts of appeal. The Supreme Court has said that 
although broadcasters do have some first amendment rights, it is the public's "right to 
know" and to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas 
which is paramount over the broadcasters' right to disseminate information. Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). However, over the same time period that the 
Court has be affirming restrictions on broadcasters, it has granted new and broader 
freedoms to news journalists and newspaper publishers. Under no circumstances has the 
Court permitted a prior injunction against publishing information in a publisher's posses-
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Finally, U.S. policy on DBS must be consistent with domestic 
law and with the constraints imposed upon the federal govern-
ment by the first amendment to the Constitution. Any modifica-
tion in this area must be principled and based upon a clear concep-
tual foundation to avoid undercutting domestic constitutional pro-
tections of the highest order. 
Traditional first amendment analysis focuses on the prohibi-
tion of government intervention in the communication process.74 
This line of inquiry begins by asking what limitations, if any, the 
first amendment imposes upon government regulation of informa-
tion.75 The affirmative theory of the first amendment, which 
underlies much of U.S. broadcast law, emphasizes the positive re-
sponsibility of the federal government to "unclog obstructions in 
sion, even where the information has been unlawfully obtained from the government. New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). No matter how biased or scornful a 
newspaper report on a public official may be, the official has no right of criminal complaint, 
or of access to the paper to respond, and may recover under the civil law only if (s)he can 
prove the report was both false and published with actual knowledge that it was to be likely 
untrue. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). And finally, the Court has recently held that the first 
amendment protects the journalist's right to seek information from public proceedings and 
papers. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 535 (1980). 
74. Domestic law has long grappled with the tension between governmental restraint 
and communications freedom. Nowhere is the Surpeme Court's struggle and uncertain con-
ception of communications freedom better illustrated than in New York Times Co. v. 
United States, the landmark "Pentagon Papers" case, supra note 73. Although the ultimate 
result of the case was that the executive branch of the federal government could not re-
strain publication of documents unlawfully obtained from federal files, the separate opinions 
filed by each of the nine Justices reveal widely different understandings of the first amend-
ment and its role in a democratic society. As Chief Justice Burger remarked in his dissent, 
"Only those who view the first amendment as an absolute in all circumstances ... can find 
such a case as this to be simple or easy." Id. at 748. Indeed, even the Court's foremost first 
amendment absolutist, Justice Black, narrowly defined communication and refused to ac-
cept competing values to preserve the integrity of his absolutist position. Justice Black 
believed that the freedoms of press and speech covered only printed and oral communica-
tion occurring in a passive context, and he refused to acknowledge a constitutional right of 
individual privacy to be free of intrusive information gathering and dissemination. The 
debate over first amendment values among the members of the Court will surely continue 
and multiply with each new generation of communication technology. However, there are no 
longer any absolutist justices on the Supreme Court, and the present justices seem inclined 
to balance carefully competing constitutional values with the first amendment, while re-
maining sensitive to first amendment interests arising in an array of modern contexts. 
75. As applied to international DBS broadcasting, the traditional theory would ask 
whether the first amendment in any way constrains government regulation of imported and 
exported programming and if so, whether these constraints are the same as those applied to 
domestic broadcasting. 
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the market place of ideas."76 Under the affirmative theory of the 
first amendment, government is not only permitted to intervene 
in the communication flow, but, under certain circumstances, has 
an affirmative duty to do so in order to broaden dissemination of, 
and citizen access to, political, social and aesthetic ideas and infor-
mation.77 An affirmative first amendment analysis would ask not 
what the U.S. might do by way of regulating international DBS 
service, but rather what it must do to provide its citizens with 
some opportunity for cross-cultural communication. U.S. intran-
sigence on its free flow policy to the extent of excluding interna-
tional DBS service would be as offensive to the affirmative first 
amendment theory as a federal government claim of an absolute 
right to control imported and exported information, unrestrained 
by the first amendment, would be to the traditional theory. Denial 
of citizens' access to all cross-cultural communication by DBS, due 
to insistence upon either an absolute right to communicate inter-
nationally or an absolute right to control U.S. international com-
munications, would perpetuate, rather than unclog, current 
obstacles to an international marketplace of ideas.78 
76. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). "It is the right of the 
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and ex-
periences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by 
Congress or by the FCC." Id. at 390. 
77. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 653-67 (1970). After 
describing the current concentration of control and scarcity of access in domestic mass 
media, Professor Emerson states: 
The result is that the system is choked with communication based upon con-
ventional wisdom and becomes incapable of performing its basic function. Search 
for truth is handicapped because much of the argument is never heard or is heard 
only weakly. Political decisions are distorted because the views of some citizens 
never reach other citizens and feedback to the government is feeble. The possibil-
ity of orderly social change is greatly diminished because those persons with the 
most urgent grievances come to believe the system is unworkable and merely 
shields the existing order. Under these circumstances it becomes essential, if the 
system is to survive, that a search be made for ways to use the law and legal in-
stitutions in an affirmative program to restore the system to effective working 
order. 
Id. at 628-29 (emphasis added). 
78. Professor Price's excellent paper on the first amendment constraints upon U.S. 
policy on DBS, see Price, supra note 37, describes long-standing international concern over 
transborder broadcasting, even in nations having strong free speech traditions such as 
Great Britain and Canada. His analysis begins by asking the extreme question of whether 
the first amendment imposes any constraint on federal government regulation of the import 
and export of information; or, in other words, whether the first amendment has application 
only to communication originated and received within U.S. borders. Professor Price asserts 
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The affirmative theory, however, does not afford the federal 
government unrestricted license to control communication flow. 
Government intervention may not be undertaken for partisan po-
litical purposes.79 Government may not determine truth or falsity 
of ideas.80 And government may not dictate the content of broad-
cast communication.81 Government intervention under the affirma-
that this narrow view would make a mockery of the principle of free and fair debate, but 
finds little judicial support for the contrary position. 
After rejecting this minimalist interpretation of first amendment scope, he then con-
siders whether different standards might exist for internal and transborder communication. 
In the broadcast area, Professor Price cites examples of limitations upon international com-
munications which would be tolerated upon domestic communication: the first, an FCC 
regulation which restrains broadcasters transmitting internationally from airing programs 
which reflect adversely on U.S. politics and society, Price, supra note 37, at 58, citing 47 
C.F.R. § 73.788(a) (1980), and the second, the statutory prohibition against alien ownership of 
U.S. broadcast stations, Price, supra note 37, at 60, citing 47 U.S.C. §310 (1976). Although 
these constraints upon the export and import of broadcast information have not been 
squarely tested by the courts, Professor Price suggests that they would be affirmed 
because of judicial deference to administrative and legislative determinations, especially in 
the foreign policy field. Likewise, he believes it beyond question that the FCC could 
regulate imported broadcast signals to insure compliance with domestic law on lotteries, 
obscenity and, presumably, fairness. Finally, Professor Price cites examples of domestic 
broadcast regulation (ownership, competition and content) as further support for the propo-
sition that U.S. agreement to and participation in international control of DBS programming 
would not offend the Constitution nor violate domestic laws. Id. at 57-68. 
79. After affirming the FCC's chain broadcasting rules as applied to license awards in 
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), Justice Frankfurter stated 
for the court: 
But Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among applicants 
upon the basis of their political, economic or social views, or upon any other 
capricious basis. If it did, or if the Commission by these Regulations proposed a 
choice among applicants upon some such basis, the issue before us would be wholly 
different. 
Id. at 226. 
The issue did, of course, arise. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 
1101, vacated as moot, 516 F.2d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976), which 
involved NBC's broadcasting of the documentary "Pensions: The Broken Promise." The 
FCC determined that the program violated the fairness doctrine, but the Court of Appeals 
reversed on the basis that intervention by the FCC was political in nature, going to support 
certain prospective legislation and to reject other proposals. 
80. Thaddeus L. Kowalski, 46 F.C.C.2d 124 (1974); Neckritz v. FCC, 502 F.2d 411 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974); National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, vacated as moot, 516 F.2d 1180 
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976). See also note 79 supra. 
81. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976) states: 
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the 
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any 
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the 
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio 
communication. 
See also Yale Broadcasting v. FCC, 414 U.S. 914 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
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tive theory of the first amendment is tested by whether it re-
sults in expanded choice, and by whether the public has received a 
greater array of communication and balance of belief.82 
VIII AFFIRMATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AS 
APPLIED TO DBS PROPOSALS 
The affirmative theory, as applied by the courts and the FCC, 
provides an interesting contrast to the present policy proposals 
for international DBS service. While the affirmative theory might 
tolerate the proposed U .S.S.R. code restrictions on DBS regarding 
such things as pornography, racial hatred and narcotic use83 (in-
tended to make the programming more generally acceptable, and 
therefore, of service to a wider audience), it would be offended by 
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
82. See, e.g., Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) in 
which the Court of Appeals overturned an FCC decision to rely on the marketplace to pro-
vide competition; the Court said that competition might sometimes be inadequate to this 
purpose, and that in such cases the FCC had a duty to intervene, e.g. to consider market 
diversity in its deliberations regarding a format change application. In WNCN Listeners' 
Guild v. FCC, 45 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1404 (1979), the FCC issued a policy statement 
establishing its reliance upon market competition rather than agency regulation to provide 
diversity. The Court of Appeals, in vacating this statement of policy, admonished the FCC 
that the market may give an imperfect reflection of society's needs, and that the agency 
should be ready to step in and regulate to promote diversity when necessary. Although the 
Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals and supported the Commission view, 
strong arguments are found on both sides and the issue may not yet be finally settled. See 
WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd 450 U.S. 582 (1981). 
A discussion articulating the FCC's responsibility can be found in Emerson, supra 
note 77, at 634. Emerson places the burden of proof upon the government proponent of the 
regulation to establish 
Id. 
(a) that the control is clearly necessary to correct a grave abuse in the opera-
tion of the system and is narrowly limited to that end, and that this objective can-
not be achieved by other means; (b) that the regulation does not limit the content 
of expression; (c) that the regulation operates equitably and with no undue advan-
tage to any group or point of view; (d) that the control is in the nature of a regula-
tion, not a prohibition, and does not substantially impair the area of expression 
controlled; and (e) that the regulation can be specifically formulated in objective 
terms and is reasonably free of the possibility of administrative abuse. 
83. 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(l)(D) (1976) provides that the Commission shall -
(m)(l) Have authority to suspend the license of any operator upon proof sufficient 
to satisfy the Commission that the licensee -
(D) has transmitted superfluous radio communications or signals or communi-
cations containing profane or obscene words, language, or meaning .... 
See also 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976); Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 34 F.C.C. 101 (1963). 
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direct attempts to determine what does and what does not \lnder-
mine foundations of local culture and tradition, or misinform the 
public. For example, although the FCC has sought in its rules to 
provide an outlet for local community expression, it has attempted 
to do so by requiring broadcast licensees to research and respond 
to unique local culture; the FCC does not itself determine the foun-
dations of a particular local culture.84 Similarly, the FCC may re-
quire a broadcast licensee to give a more balanced presentation of 
a public interest issue, but the manner in which other perspec-
tives are presented and the amount of time allotted these perspec-
tives are within the broad discretion of the broadcaster.85 The 
Commission never endeavors to determine truth or falsity, or 
what is and what is not misinformation.86 
The affirmative theory also contrasts with the Swedish-
Canadian proposal in some respects. The affirmative theory would 
not tolerate prior restraints or a government's arbitrary per pro-
gram exclusion of DBS communication under the guise of prior 
consent. Exclusion would be justified only where a state could 
show a compelling need to protect the welfare of its citizens, or to 
promote the development of new channels of communication. U.S. 
law strives to check ad hoc or arbitrary administrative action, 
especially as it applies to freedom of communication. The FCC has 
repeatedly refused to engage in detailed inquiries into the daily 
pr.ogramming and management decisions of the licensee, and has 
84. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 
27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1973). For cases considering earlier FCC ascertainment policy, see Brown 
Broadcasting Co., Inc., 9 F.C.C.2d 168 (1967), discussing the need to ascertain local needs 
and to program to meet them; Almardon Inc. of Florida, 16 F.C.C.2d 395 (1969), requiring 
that applicant survey his service area, set forth and analyze suggestions, evaluate priorities 
and propose responsive programming; and Southern Minnesota Supply Co., 18 F.C.C.2d 824 
(1969), establishing the need to ascertain and meet the needs and interests of the service 
area. 
85. See, Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public In-
terest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974); Applicability of the 
Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 
598 (1964). 
86. The 197 4 Fairness Report in discussing accurate news reporting stated that it 
would not be "useful or appropriate [for the FCC] to investigate charges to news misrepre-
sentations in the absence of substantial extrinsic evidence or documents that on their face 
reflect deliberate distortion," Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine and the 
Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, supra note 85, at 21. Moreover, 
deliberate distortion will not prejudice license renewal unless it is shown that the licensee 
was directly and knowingly involved. See also, Network Coverage of the Democratic Na-
tional Convention, 16 F.C.C.2d 650 (1969). 
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instead reviewed the broadcaster's composite programming rec-
ord every three years when licenses are renewed to determine 
overall balance and quality of public service.87 The Commission has 
never enjoined the broadcast of a program, nor summarily 
ordered a licensee off the air. 88 And when the Commission does 
act, its actions must not be tainted by partisan or political bias.89 On 
the other hand, the Commission has acted aggressively on matters 
affecting the welfare of children, public health and safety, and com-
munity morals.90 The FCC has also intervened in the communica-
87. "[A]ny approach whereby a government agency would undertake to govern day-
to-day editorial decisions of broadcast licensees endangers the loss of journalistic discretion 
and First Amendment values." National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1119 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (referring to Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 
U.S. 94 (1973)); see also, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. FCC, 481 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The 
FCC in granting this broad discretion to the licensee, has stated: "The genius of the fairness 
doctrine has been precisely the leeway and discretion it affords the licensee to discharge his 
obligation to contribute to an informed electorate." The Handling of Public Issues Under 
the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 36 
F.C.C.2d 40, 48, 24 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1917 (1972). This policy clearly establishes great 
agency deference to broadcaster judgment. See National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 
1101 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also text accompanying note 92, infra. 
88. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
"[I]ndividual licensees should be free to program as they see fit without judicial in-
terference; ... neither the F.C.C. nor the NAB should be permitted to interfere with in-
dependent licensee decisionmaking." Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. 
Supp. 1064, 1153 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The appropriate remedy in case of "a serious danger that 
the defendants would ignore" other rulings and guidelines, is not at any rate ordering a 
broadcaster off the air. Rather, the FCC issues gentle warnings, enforcement letters, and 
finally, if necessary, cease and desist orders. The sanction of denying license renewal has 
rarely been used. See D. GILLMORE & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW, 871-73 (3d ed. 
1979); 47 u.s.c. §§ 312, 503(b)(l)-(5) (1976). 
89. See Justice Douglas' concurrence in Columbia Broadcasting: the fear which pro-
vided the stimulus for the creation of the first amendment "was founded not only on the 
spectre of a lawless government but of government under the control of a faction that 
desired to foist its views of the common good on the people." Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 148 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
See also note 82, supra. 
90. Early on, service "inimical to the public welfare or contrary to the public interest" 
was denied. Lottery Cases, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal 
Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), denied service found to be against community 
morals and public interest in that it included religious attacks, obstructed justice, and was 
sensational rather than instructive or informative. Such denial of license did not violate the 
first amendment, the court held, since other avenues of expression were freely available. 
Justice Groner wrote: 
If it be considered that one in possession of a permit to broadcast in interstate 
commerce may, without let or hindrance from any source, use these facilities, 
reaching out, as they do, from one corner of the country to the other, to obstruct 
the administration of justice, offend the religious susceptibilities of thousands, in-
spire political distrust and civic discord, or offend youth or innocence by the free 
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tions flow to nurture the development of new mass communication 
services and thereby ultimately to expand mass communication 
outlets.91 
The U.S. free flow policy shares with the affirmative first 
amendment theory the goals of promoting communication and pro-
tecting the individual's right to be informed. However, there exist 
substantial conceptual differences between the two. Free flow 
policy is absolutist and values freedom of communication as an end 
in itself. Affirmative theory is relativistic and values free com-
munciation as a means to achieve popular enlightenment. Free 
flow seeks the unfettered movement of information, whereas the 
affirmative theory is equally concerned with the quantity of infor-
mation and the diversity of sources.92 
The affirmative theory also suggests international procedural 
possibilities. Domestically, the affirmative theory depends upon a 
grand scheme of bureaucratic deference among appellate and trial 
courts, the FCC and broadcast licenses. Appellate courts are 
bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact, and may overturn 
the trial court's decision only if there has been a clearly erroneous 
application of law.93 In reviewing FCC decisions, trial courts may 
use of words suggestive of sexual morality, and be answerable for slander only at 
the instance of the one offended, then this great science, instead of a boon, will 
become a scourge, and the nation a theater for the display of individual passions 
and the collision of personal interests. 
Id. at 852-53. 
Although standards have grown somewhat more lenient, there is still a definite pro-
tectionism toward youth, the public health and safety, and community morals. See 
Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Ac-
tion for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Applicability of the 
Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Amendment of Part 73 of the Federal Communications Commission 
Rules with Regard to the Advertisement of Cigarettes, 16 F.C.C.2d 284 (1969); FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Yale Broadcasting v. FCC, 414 U.S. 914 (1973); 
Writer's Guild of America, West, Inc., v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1964 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
91. See, United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); Cable Televi-
sion Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972). 
92. [T]he greatest distortions in our system of free expression have developed in 
the mass media, and the efforts to eliminate these distortions have created many 
of the most difficult and controversial questions. The principal goals of regulation 
are (1) to create a greater diversity in the expression communicated by the media, 
and (2) to give a greater number of individuals and groups access to the media. 
Emerson, supra note 77, at 653. See generally, remarks of Professor Abram Chayes and Mr. 
Harry Olsson in Control of Program Content, supra note 48, at 40-67. 
93. See, e.g.' HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
32-36 (2d ed. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler eds. 1973). 
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not substitute their judgment for that of the Commission, and 
even where the court may disagree with the wisdom of an FCC de-
termination, it will not reverse the Commission unless the deter-
mination was arbitrary, capricious or totally unsupported by the 
tendered record.9' And, as noted above, the FCC, in reviewing pro-
gramming decisions of a broadcaster, may not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the broadcaster, and can apply sanctions only 
after holding hearings and finding the broadcaster's conduct clear-
ly unreasonable and unwarranted.95 
Advancement of affirmative first amendment theory in U.S. 
international communication policy would provide a new alter-
native to present policy proposals, new prospects for compromise, . 
and a new degree of consistency between domestic and interna-
tional communications law. Although the first amendment may ap-
ply different standards to domestic and international communica-
tions,96 the affirmative theory provides an opportunity to develop 
an as yet unrealized congruity between domestic and international 
law on the concept and meaning of freedom of communication. 
IX. THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 AND THE 
MACBRIDE REPORT 
Previous sections have suggested that it is possible for the 
U.S. government to participate in some form of international DBS 
programming review arrangement without compromise of its com-
94. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). 
[I]ndustry regulation has been entrusted by Congress "to the informed judg-
ment of the Commission, and not to the preferences of reviewing courts." If an 
agency has "genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making ... the court exer-
cises restraint and affirms the agency's action even though the court would on its 
own account have made different findings or adopted different standards." 
National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1974), citing Permian Basin 
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968), Greater Boston TV Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 
851 (1970). 
95. "The FCC's function becomes that of correcting the licensee for abuse of discus-
sion, as our [the court's] function in judicial review is that of correcting the agency for abuse 
of discretion." National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See 47 
U.S.C. §§ 312(c), 506(b)(3) (1976). See also notes 79, 87 and 88, supra. 
96. Because of the foreign policy implications, the first amendment might grant 
greater policy leeway to the federal government in the regulation of international com-
munication than in domestic communication. Moreover, with respect to international com-
munications, the federal government might have more flexibility to control outgoing infor-
mation directed at persons not covered by first amendment protections, than to control in-
coming information directed as U.S. citizens. See , Comment, Direct Satellite Broadcasting 
and the First Amendment, 15 HARV. INT'L L.J . 514 (1974). Although the first amendment 
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mitment to international human rights and press freedom, and 
consistent with the first amendment. This section considers more 
particularly the ways in which accommodation might be reached 
as to the actual operation of an international DBS organization. 
The specific concern of this section is with the degree of diver-
gence between the policies embodied in the Communications Act 
of 1934 as they have been implemented, and the recommendations 
of UNESCO's International Commission for the Study of Com-
munications Problems (the MacBride Commission), should they be 
implemented.98 If the MacBride Commission recommendations are 
supported by a. majority of states at the 1983 RARC, could the 
U.S. join in a consensus on international DBS regulation consis-
tent with the principles established in the Communications Act 
and the rules of the Federal Communications Commission devel-
oped pursuant thereto?99 
does not apply to non-U.S. citizens, its guiding principles might usefully be applied in con-
sidering sales of telecommunications technology to other countries, such as the proposed 
sale of telemetry to ARABS AT. 
97. The Communications Act of 1934, supra note 17. For background reading on the 
1934 Act, and on domestic communications law and policy generally, see M. FRANKLIN, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW (1977 & Supp. 1979); D. GILLMORE & J. BARRON, 
MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW: CASES AND COMMENT (1974); D. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF 
BROADCASTING: LAW AND POLICY TOWARDS RADIO, TELEVISION AND CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 
(1979); W. JONES, THE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA (2d ed. 1979). 
98. The "MacBride Commission,'' the International Commission for the Study of Com-
munication Problems, was established in 1976 by UNESCO Director-General Amadou-
Mahtar M'Bow. Headed by Sean MacBride of Ireland, the Commission was comprised of 
representatives of France, Zaire, Columbia, the U.S.S.R., the U.S., Indonesia, Tunisia, 
Japan, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Egypt, the Netherlands, Chile, India and Canada. Its purpose 
was "to undertake a review of all the problems of communication in contemporary society 
seen against the background of technological progress and recent developments in interna-
tional relations with due regard to their complexity and magnitude." MACBRIDE REPORT, 
supra note 49, at xiv. 
The culmination of the Commission's two years of work is its publication MANY 
VOICES, ONE WORLD, id. . The report suggests the establishment of a New World Informa-
tion Order, a proposal which has met with passionate and varied response worldwide. More 
important, the study provides an invaluable collection of materials drawn from reports and 
position papers submitted by national, regional, international, and private entities and 
reflecting professional, academic and political views on every aspect of communications 
from technology to policy. Because it draws together information and views from a multi-
plicity of sources and clearly reflects the developing balance of interests in UNESCO, the 
Report is a seminal and invaluable source. 
99. It should not be assumed that there is a high degree of consensus on the recom-
mendations of the MacBride Report. The Theberge article, supra note 71, warns that 
UNESCO efforts to implement the MacBride Report suggest that Western biases are likely 
to be replaced by those of the Soviet Union and other antidemocratic nations. Popular 
reviews of the MacBride Report in the U.S. press, led, as in many domestic first amendment 
42
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1981], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol8/iss2/2
1981] Prior Consent 307 
The policies established by the 1934 Congress in the Com-
munications Act addressed questions of both industry structure 
and programming service.100 The structural policies rested upon a 
congressional declaration that the electromagnetic spectrum is 
owned by the citizens of the U.S. Congress mandated that broad-
casting services be allocated by the FCC equitably among the 
several states of the U.S.,1°1 that the FCC encourage the most effi-
cient and effective development of new communication technol-
ogy, 102 and that broadcast licensees operate in the public interest.103 
The content regulations settled upon by Congress rested on 
the proposition that the electromagnetic spectrum is a scarce 
natural resource and that broadcasting is an inherently limited 
technology .104 As has been frequently stated by the courts, Con-
gress recognized that if everyone had a right to broadcast, the 
rights would be worthless and the public would lose the benefit of 
broadcast technology. Therefore, government must allow some 
persons access to broadcast technology while disallowing others. 
However, those awarded the right to broadcast are not to hold 
these rights for personal or selfish purposes, but as public trus-
tees responsible to the citizens in their city of license.105 This 
issues, by the New York Times and Washington Post, have been uniformly and unreserved-
ly critical. See note 69, supra. 
U.S.S.R. reaction to the final text of the Report has been equally negative. Mr. Sergei 
Losev, the U.S.S.R. representative on the MacBride Commission, set forth his concerns in 
the General Comments. Mr. Losev criticized the Commission for discussing too widely the 
right to communicate and for being caught up in the "old-fashioned and used trite formulas 
such as the notion of a free flow of information." MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 279. 
Mr. Losev asserts that these rights have. never gained international recognition, nor 
recognition in any of the countries represented on the Commission, obviously including the 
U.S. He concludes that the Report is too westernized and that it erodes the position of 
developing countries by underplaying the role of Western mass media in damaging national 
cultures. Id. at 279-80. 
In fact one of the greatest strengths of the MacBride Report, its unification of diverse 
viewpoints and information sources, also results in its greatest shortcoming. Sean MacBride 
apologizes for the Report's superficiality and the necessity of lumping together issues and 
viewpoints more validly considered individually. Such is certainly the case when considera-
tions of press freedom fail to distinguish between print and broadcast media. 
100. 47 u.s.c. § 301 (1976). 
101. 47 u.s.c. § 307(b) (1976). 
102. 47 u .s.c. § 303(g) (1976). 
103. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a), 310, 312 (1976). 
104. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); National Broadcasting 
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211 (1943); and RCA Global Communications, Inc., 56 
F.C.C.2d 660 (1975). 
105. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prohibits the Government 
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public trustee concept is the foundation of broadcast content 
regulation in the United States. 
The policies of the Communications Act are echoed in the 
MacBride Report General Recommendations. The MacBride Com-
mission urges that the geostationary orbit is a scarce natural 
resource, that it is beyond private and sovereign appropriation, 
and that its development must be for the common good of all per-
sons.106 The MacBride Commission insists that access to the geo-
stationary orbit and DBS technology be enjoyed equally by all 
states and that those engaging in DBS operations not do so solely 
for partisan, national or financial purposes.101 
Similarity between the policies of the Communications Act 
and the recommendations of the MacBride Report should not be 
surprising, since the 1934 Congress and the MacBride Commission 
faced similar sets of technological and political constraints, albeit 
one with terrestrial technology and the other with space technol-
ogy. In both instances the new technology required a high degree 
of centralized coordination and had to be implemented over a large 
land mass containing multiple political units. In both instances the 
new service would affect people from diverse regions having dif-
ferent local needs, interests and tastes. Both the 1934 Congress 
and the MacBride Commission appreciated the great educational 
and entertainment potential of the new technology, as well as the 
risks of political abuse. And both explicitly recognized the need 
for some compromise of the absolute right to communicate by the 
new technology as a practical condition precedent to its implemen-
tation. Given these policy similarities between the Communica-
tions Act and the MacBride Report recommendations, one would 
expect that domestic administrative rules and intiatives might be 
responsive to certain of the MacBride Commission's concerns. 
A. Narrowing the Communication Gap Between Rich and Poor 
A fundamental theme of the MacBride Report is the need to 
eliminate among individuals and nations the gross material in-
from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself 
as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which 
are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be 
barred from the airwaves. 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). 
106. MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 12-13. 
107. Id. at 10, 96-99, 152-55, 260. 
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equalities which threaten international peace.108 The MacBride 
Commission believes that widely unequal access to communication 
technology perpetuates material disadvantage and dependency; 
thus the Commission recommends the development of new com-
munication opportunities as a principal means of promoting inde-
pendence and self-reliance.109 The U.S. has sought to reduce dis-
parities in access to communication technology based on wealth. 
The FCC has long attempted to provide parity of broadcast ser-
vice between rural and urban communities and between small and 
large cities through various schemes of cross-subsidization and 
licensing preferences.110 
The FCC has confronted problems of urban income disparity 
in formulating rules for the wiring of major cities for cable televi-
sion. The FCC was rightly concerned that cable television com-
panies, if left to their own choice, would wire the more affluent, 
and disregard the poorer sections of the city. The FCC sought to 
avoid this inequality by requiring review of cable installation 
plans and timetables before granting franchises, and by offering 
positive financial incentives to companies wiring disadvantaged 
areas on an equivalent priority basis.111 The FCC, followed by 
state government agencies, has also sought to increase equality of 
access to cable television technology by requiring cable fran-
chisees to provide studio production facilities and channel time, 
without cost and on a nondiscriminatory basis, to all persons and 
groups in the community.112 
Less often appreciated but arguably the greatest source of 
wealth equalization with respect to mass communication services 
is the zero cost of broadcast programming. Broadcasting in the 
U.S. today is free, a public good available to rich and poor alike. 
No program production tax is levied upon the sale of television 
108. See generally, MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 96-111, 123-34, 253-72. 
109. Id. at 254-58. 
110. G. GROSS & J. HERRING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: ECONOMICS AND REGULATIONS 326 
(1936); L. Johnson, Communication Satellites and Telephone Rates: Problems of Govern-
ment Regulation, Rand Memorandum RM-12845-NASA, 14, 28 (1961); Policy Statement to 
Section 307(b) Considerations for Standard Broadcast Facilities Involving Suburban Com-
munities, 2 F.C.C.2d 190 (1965); Pasadena Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). 
111. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(a)(2) (1980). 
112. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, rev'd by FCC v. Midwest 
Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). See also, Channels and Facilities for Locally Originated 
Educational and Public Service Programming, Docket No. 90174 (New York Commission on 
Cable Television). 
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equipment, nor are direct or indirect charges levied for the recep-
tion of service. The primacy of free broadcasting in the U.S. com-
munication system has often been affirmed.113 
The miracle of costless broadcasting, an essential element of 
education and entertainment in contemporary U.S. society, results 
from reliance upon commercial sponsorship to finance production 
costs. Reliance upon a private capital base to finance U.S. broad-
cast services has not resulted in wealth discrimination with 
respect to use and enjoyment, but rather has allowed for shared 
access and experience across all income divisions. In contrast, pro-
gramming by the public broadcasting system in the U.S. has been 
widely criticized on behalf of low income and minority persons. It 
is claimed that public broadcasting is elitist, that it programs ex-
clusively for upper middle class audiences, and that it is a govern-
ment subsidy to the rich.114 
Domestic experience with regard to commercial broadcasting 
is therefore directly at odds with the bias of the MacBride Report 
against the private sector. The MacBride Commission found that 
"[t]he social effects of the commercialization of the mass media are 
a major concern in policy formulation and decisionmaking by 
private and public bodies," and recommended that "[i]n expanding 
communication systems, preference should be given to noncom-
113. See, e.g., Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 164-65, rev'd by 
·F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). See also Wiley, Introduction, Com-
munications Law: Policy and Problems, 61 VA. L. REV. 465, 468 (1975). 
114. The dissatisfaction has been cogently expressed by FCC Commissioner Benjamin 
L. Hooks, who wrote in his dissenting opinion in Puerto Rican Media Action and Educa-
tional Council, Inc., 51 F .C.C.2d 1178 (1975): 
By styling itself, preponderantly, as a Harvard liberal arts course, public broad-
casting has forsaken those less privileged and influential whose cultural and educa-
tional needs are far more on a "street academy" or community college scale .... 
Public television, without the legal or moral right to do so, has become the Cauca-
sian intellectual's home entertainment game. 
Id. at 1199 (footnote omitted). The reasons for public broadcasting's failure, or partial 
failure, to meet its mandate of local and minority service are complex, but one major cause 
is the lack of money. Federal funding cutbacks begun under the Nixon Administration will 
be intensified in the Reagan Administration. Program choices are constrained by inade-
quate budgets; locally-owned and land grant college-based public broadcasting stations can't 
affort to undertake programming themselves, but must acquire it from centralized sources 
via auction. See note 41, supra. It should not be assumed that such purchase of a program is 
necessarily a good indication of its popularity or desirability: for example, in the 1974-75 
season programming auction, "[a]fter several rounds of bids, the top choice turned out to be 
Japanese Film Festival, apparently because it was one of the least expensive offerings." S. 
HEAD, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 188 (3d. ed. 1976). See also, Chapman, Down with Public 
Television, HARPER'S, Aug. 1979, at 77. 
46
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1981], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol8/iss2/2
1981] Prior Consent 311 
mercial forms of mass communication."115 While few would deny 
the need for some noncommercial mass media in society, the bene-
fits derived from commercial mass media should not be underesti-
mated, nor should its adverse societal impact be overestimated. 
Mr. Elie Abel, the U.S. representative on the MacBride Commis-
sion, commented that "[a]t no time [had] the commission seen 
evidence adduced in support of the notion that market and com-
mercial considerations necessarily exert a negative effect upon 
communication flows." 116 He further asserted that the MacBride 
Commission is aware of the benefits of an independent media, and 
that "market mechanisms play an increasingly important role [in 
the media] today even in so-called planned economies."117 Mr. Abel 
cited support of courageous journalism as a benefit of commercial 
mass media; he could also have added the wealth equalization to 
which commercial media has contributed. 
B. Control of Commercial Content and Private Access to DBS 
Technology 
Reliance upon a private capital base and commercial sponsor-
ship to finance DBS programming services is possible without ig-
noring the MacBride Commission's concern over the commer-
cialization of the mass media and the potential for private abuse. 
U.S. domestic law has also addressed these concerns. Historically, 
commercial speech has been subject to far greater government 
regulation in the U.S. than has political or other speech.118 This dif-
ference in the degree of first amendment protection has been 
justified by proposing a basic distinction between communication 
for the purpose of pecuniary profit and exchange of money, and 
communication for the purposes of intellectual provocation or the 
exchange of ideas.119 While recent Supreme Court cases suggest a 
115. MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 260. 
116. Id. at 260 n.1. 
117. Id. 
118. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
119. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 
(1973). 
Insisting that the exchange of information is as important in the commercial 
realm as in any other, the newspaper here would have us abrogate the distinction 
between commercial and other speech .... Any First Amendment interest which 
might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might 
arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regulation is 
altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction 
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narrowing of the gap between commercial and political speech, 
with commercial speech receiving greater protections than for-
merly, important distinctions allowing time, place and manner reg-
ulation of commercial speech, especially broadcast, persist.120 
Paid commercial broadcast advertisements are subject to 
both FCC and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) scrutiny.121 The 
FTC monitors the accuracy and truthfulness of broadcast adver-
tisements and has the power to ban misleading commercials and to 
compel sponsor retraction of false claims.122 The FCC has largely 
been concerned with problems of excessive commercialization by 
broadcast stations123 and broader public interest concerns regard-
ing the content and conduct of broadca.st advertising. For exam-
ple, the FCC, and later Congress, prohibited the broadcast of ciga-
rette advertising;124 and the Gommission has studied at length the 
problems of advertising associated with children's television pro-
on advertising is incidential to a valid limitation on economic activity. 
Id. at 388-89. These remaining discrepancies in constitutional status are premised upon the 
assumption that commercial speech, since it is motivated by pecuniary profit, js more "hardy" 
than political speech and, therefore, less likely to wilt in the chill of government regulation. 
120. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), where the Court discusses 
the permissible time, place and manner restrictions on advertising by attorneys and states 
that "the special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcasting media will warrant 
special consideration." Id. at 384. See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
121. See Licensee Responsibility with Respect to the Broadcast of False, Misleading or 
Deceptive Advertising, 32 F.C.C.2d 396 (1961); Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 27 RAD. 
REG. 2d (P & F) 670 (1973); W. JONES, ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA, 276-79 (2d ed. 1979). 
122. See Licensee Responsibility, supra note 121, at 400, 404, 405; FTC Statement on 
Broadcast Ratings, 1 F.C.C.2d 1078 (1965); K Mart Enterprises, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 
(CCH) 1 20,661 (1974); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). 
123. See AM-FM Program Forms, 30 Fed. Reg. 10,195 (1965); Television Program 
Forms, 31 Fed. Reg. 13,228 (1966), suggesting a maximum of 18 minutes per hour of commer-
cial messages for AM and FM and a maximum of 16 minutes per hour for TV. In reliance 
upon competitive market forces to check excess commercialization, the FCC eliminated the 
guidelines as to AM and FM in its recent Radio Deregulation rules, supra note 18. The 
guidelines as to TV continue to apply. See WNJU-TV Broadcasting Corp., 57 F.C.C.2d 394 
(1975). In addition, FCC rules delegating authority to the Broadcasting Bureau include 
guidelines on the percentage of broadcast time to be devoted by television to non-commer-
ical, non-entertainment programming. 47 C.F.R. § 0.281(a)(8) (1980). 
124. "After January 1, 1971, it shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes in any medium 
of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the F.C.C." Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976). The constitutionality of the prohibi-
tion was upheld in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd 
sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
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gramming and has prohibited practices which tended to confuse 
the programming and commercials in the child's mind.125 
Similar safeguards would be necessary if there is to be pri-
vate commercial access to DBS technology. Inquiry by an interna-
tional organization into the commercial advertising practices 
which a private applicant proposes to follow, both as to the types 
of commercial messages to be presented and the manner of 
presentation, would clearly seem appropriate. Applicants limiting 
commercial messages to announcements of support for program 
funding, or to institutional advertising to promote national, firm 
or industry goodwill, might be preferred over applicants propos-
ing product advertising. There might also be selectivity as to the 
particular products to be sold via DBS service. Review of the ac-
curacy and the truthfulness of DBS advertisements and the 
authority to ban misleading commercials and/or to compel sponsor 
retraction would clearly be necessary .126 
Additionally, the MacBride Report recommends consideration 
of ways to reduce the influence of commercial mass media on na-
tional and international political processes.127 U.S. communication 
125. See Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, supra note 90. 
On the basis of the information gathered in the course of the Commission's in-
quiry, it has become apparent that children, especially young children, have con-
siderable difficulty distinguishing commercial matter from program matter .... 
Special measures should, therefore, be taken by licensees to insure that an ade-
quate separation is maintained on programs designed for children. 
Id. at ,,47, 49. 
126. See notes 121 and 122, supra, and accompanying text. It may be very difficult, 
however, to go beyond this degree of regulation by applying, for example, fairness doctrine 
concepts to balance product advertisements. At one point, the FCC flirted with the imposi-
tion of the fairness doctrine on broadcast product advertisements on the theory that com-
mercials invariably emphasize only the positive aspects of a product, and the public has a 
right to know the negative aspects as well. Because every product has some negative 
aspects to someone, the Commission received a host of requests for enforcement against 
varied products. The definitional and administrative difficulties inherent in the attempt to 
balance the positive and negative aspects of every broadcast commercial caused the Com-
mission to redefine its position and limit the fairness doctrine to paid announcements 
presenting an express editorial opinion on a contemporary issue. Handling of Public Issues 
Under the Fairness Doctrine, supra note 85, Part III (Application of the Fairness Doctrine 
to the Broadcast of Paid Announcements), ,60. The FCC's reconsideration of the fairness 
doctrine as applied to paid announcements was upheld in Public Interest Research Group v. 
FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975). 
The Commission was also unwilling to adopt an FTC proposal providing access for pur-
poses of counter commercials, Matter of Handling Public Issues, Part III, supra, F2. See 
also National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
127. MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 260. 
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policy has been sensitive to political and propaganda use of com-
mercial access to television, and has sought to limit the use of 
television by commercial entities for purposes other than con-
sumer product sponsorship and promotion of company good will. 
Paid commercial editorials ("aditorials") trigger the fairness doc-
trine and subject broadcasters to regulatory oversight.128 For this 
reason, the three major U.S. networks have uniformly refused to 
accept paid editorial announcements by commercial entities. In-
deed, even official political parties have no right under U.S. law to 
purchase broadcast time to air their views. The Supreme Court 
had held, in a case involving the Democratic National Committee, 
that the national television networks can refuse to sell air time for 
general political advertisements and that nothing in the Com-
munications Act of 1934 nor the first amendment grants a right of 
access to political parties.129 In the opinion, Chief Justice Burger 
straightforwardly addressed the inequalities inherent in a right of 
paid political access to the broadcast media. The Court found that 
under such a scheme, the wealthy would have far greater oppor-
tunities than the poor to advance their views and establish 
political agendas, and that governmental attempts to devise com-
pensatory schemes would involve cumbersome and intolerable in-
volvement in daily broadcast programming.130 The Court concluded 
that the public right to know was better served by requiring 
broadcast licensees to be fair in their coverage of issues, rather 
than by allowing a right of access for a select few persons to pre-
sent their views.131 Similar limitations upon access by commercial 
and political entities to DBS technology under a private system 
would seem appropriate. 
C. Promoting Diversity and Choice in the Content of 
Communication 
Another major concern of the MacBride Report is that the 
128. Part III (Application of the Fairness Doctrine to the Broadcast of Paid An-
nouncements, Editorial Advertising), supra note 126. See Wilderness Society, 30 F.C.C.2d 
643 (1971), applying the fairness doctrine to paid commercial messages by ESSO on the need 
to develop Alaskan oil reserves and the lack of environmental damage. 
129. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 
(1973). See generally, The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209 
(1978). 
130. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 
120-21, 127 (1973). 
131. Id. at 122-27. 
50
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1981], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol8/iss2/2
1981] Prior Consent 315 
mass media be responsive to the unique needs and interests of 
minority groups. The Report states: 
Diversity and choice in the content of communication are a 
precondition for democratic participation. Every individual and 
particular groups should be able to form judgments on the basis 
of a full range of information and a variety of messages and opin-
ions and have the opportunity to share these ideas with others. 
The development of decentralized and diversified media should 
provide larger opportunities for a real direct involvement of the 
people in communication processes.132 
132. MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 266-67. It is important to note here that ongoing 
attempts are being made, with varying degrees of success, to meet this need. The Report 
mentions several regional cooperatives or news services, including CANA in the Caribbean 
and PANA in Africa, which have recently been organized or instituted. Others in the plan-
ning stages include an Asian network, a Latin American Feature agency and a network in-
volving the oil-producing countries and dealing primarily with problems and prospects in 
worldwide energy development. Id. at 85-86. 
LDC's are beginning to pool their resources for practical reasons as well as in fur-
therance of their goal to create a more balanced information flow. Communications under-
takings require increasingly complex technology. Resources are pooled to acquire equip-
ment, to train personnel (for example technicians, legal staffs, foreign correspondents and 
editors) and to secure satellite potential. 
There are also established and successful alternative international news services; the 
News Agency Pool of Non-Aligned Countries (Pool) and the Inter Press Service (IPS) have 
made gains and continue to develop. IPS, formed in 1964, is headquartered in Rome and in-
cludes regional (language-based) centers in Bogota, London and Tunis, and IPS Third 
World, centered in Panama. IPS included (as of 1978) eighteen national news services, and 
drew stories from a wealth of other (non-national) sources including the UN (and various of 
its agencies), the Pool, the World Council of Churches, and so on. The emphasis of IPS re-
porting is on continuing process rather than spot event; IPS stories are longer than conven-
tional news stories and provide in-depth coverage rather than (or in addition to) instant 
news. IPS seeks to develop 
[n]ew approaches to types of information to be transmitted ... [because] news of 
the social process is in short supply in stories of the traditional agencies .... IPS is 
trying to develop a kind of journalism "which focuses directly on the processes of 
development ... to provide systematic and procedural coverage of the successes 
and problems of development in the various Third World countries." 
Hester, Inter Press Service: News For and About the Third World, in THIRD WORLD MASS 
MEDIA: ISSUES, THEORY AND RESEARCH 83, 89 (1979), quoting Harris, The International Infor-
mation Order: Problems and Responses, Research and Information Unit IPS (January 1979). 
The Pool was formed in 1975 and three years later included more than fifty nations. Its 
focus, like IPS', is basically upon development within its service area. Pool's objectives in-
clude increasing cooperation and understanding among non-aligned and lesser developed na-
tions, and eliminating dependence on established news services. (The charges of "cultural 
imperialism" to which Western journalists react with such outrage are leveled, it should be 
mentioned, just as squarely at TASS as at UPI, AP and Reuters). 
Although the Third World would like to turn the one-way news and information flow into 
a balanced flow, there are clearly obstacles to the use by Western news services of the 
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Mentioned in the Report as deserving of particular consideration 
were the concerns of children, youth, and national, ethnic, religi-
ous and linquistic minorities.133 
Again, U.S. domestic law has addressed the same concerns 
and has sought to stimulate programming reflective of, and 
responsive to, minority life and needs. Chief Justice Burger has 
been a leading force in this area as well. In a landmark decision, 
which he rendered prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court, 
he held that private citizens and groups have standing (a right to 
participate and be heard) in hearings before the FCC and the 
courts to contest the renewal of broadcast stations' licenses.134 The 
case, which involved complaints of racial discrimination against a 
Mississippi television station, became precedent for many other 
minority groups to redress grievances against radio and television 
stations. Faced with the mutually unattractive prospect of pro-
stories provided by IPS, the Pool and other such organizations. First, while it has been 
charged that the developed countries simply don't care about the problems and concerns of 
LDCs, since their audiences are viewed simply as purchasers of a commodity (news), it has 
been maintained that very little foreign news, from whatever nation at whatever level of 
development, is included in domestic services. See remarks of M. Masmoudi and E. Abel, 
MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 147 n.3, 148 n.2. 
Second, the nature of this news itself discourages such exchange. News which is 
politically engendered and/or is edited and designed to convey a certain impression or view-
point is not likely to find a warm reception from news services and audiences which seek un-
biased and factual reporting. It may be "that a balanced flow of news is an unrealistic expec-
tion, and that internal restrictions on views in the Third World is an important (and 
Western) explanation for a paucity of serious and vital news flowing to the West." Merrill, 
"The Free Flow of News" and "Western Communication Imperialism": Divergent Views 
on Ethical Issues' in THIRD WORLD MASS MEDIA: ISSUES, THEORY AND RESEARCH 27' 41 
(1979). Government-sponsored news reporting may simply contrast too starkly with the 
kind of investigative, sometimes anti-government, journalism to which many developed na-
tions have become accustomed. 
A third and related obstacle is the format of the news stories. The IPS/Pool emphasis 
on process is arguably necessary and even laudable, but Western audiences may not have 
the interest or desire to follow sustained, developmental journalism about areas and con-
cerns in which they are not involved. "Spot coverage" as developed by Western news ser-
vice probably responds to audience desires; the longer and in-depth stories from IPS or the 
Pool may fail to appeal simply because of format. 
Finally, although the gap is rapidly narrowing, the technical quality of programs 
prepared by smaller, less sophisticated services may be partly responsible for the reluc-
tance of the established international services to carry such programs. 
Whatever the causes, it is clear that although the Third World news services offer an 
important and valuable alternative to the established international services, a truthful and 
truly balanced flow from genuinely diverse sources is not yet a reality. 
133. MACBRIDE REPORT, supra note 49, at 168-69, 188. 
134. United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
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longed litigation, broadcasters and minority citizen groups fre-
quently reach accommodation of interests through private nego-
tiations.135 Some of the major concerns which have been addressed 
in this ongoing dialogue include underrepresentation and stereo-
typing of groups in programming and inattentiveness or insen-
sitivity to minority cultural values. 
Other interest groups with more diffuse aims have also bene-
fited from the liberalization of the standing rules. Groups concerned 
with the quantity and quality of children's television program-
ming,136 with avoidance of sex and violence during family viewing 
hours, 137 and with the spread of spiritual or sectarian messages 
have all received favorable forums in the Commission and the 
courts.138 
The FCC licensing policies also reflect concern for minority 
needs and interests by seeking to increase minority ownership of 
broadcast stations through the provision of preferential tax treat-
ment of transfers to minority-controlled corporations.139 The Com-
mission has sought further to stimulate diverse program service 
by granting license preferences to Black and foreign language 
radio formats in certain markets. 
In these respects, U.S. domestic broadcast policy has em-
braced and encouraged the MacBride Report objectives of 
democratization of communication and the removal of obstacles to 
an open communication process and a free interchange of ideas, in-
formation and experience among equals, without dominance or dis-
crimination. The absolutist position asserted by the U.S. in inter-
135. See Agreements Between Broadcast Licensees and the Public, 57 F .C.C.2d 42 
(1975). 
136. See Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, supra note 90. 
137. See Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 
F.C.C.2d 418 (1975). 
138. Religious programming poses special problems for the Commission. See Cox, The 
FCC, the Constitution and Religious Broadcast Programming, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 196 
(1965); Lacey, The Electric Church: An F.C.C. - "Established" Institution? 31 FED. CoM. 
L.J. 235 (1979); Loevinger, Religious Liberty and Broadcasting, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 631 
(1965). 
139. See, e.g., Statement on Policy of Minority Ownership, 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978); 
Clarification of Distress Sale Policy, 44 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 479 (1978). The FCC has also 
cooperated with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to encourage affirmative 
action programs for employment of minorities. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 (1980). Licensee per-
formance under affirmative action programs is considered in conjunction with applications 
for license renewals. See EEO Processing Guidelines, 47 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 438 (1980). See 
also note 45, supra. 
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national forums is not only at wide variance with its own domestic 
policies, but in the long run may work against the U.S. interest in 
increasing transborder communication. The choice before the U.S. 
may be either to insist on the absolute freedom to communicate, in 
which case there may be no international DBS service, or to 
modify its policy and agree to popular controls not inconsistent 
with its domestic policies,140 in which case the people of the 
Western Hemisphere might for the first time share in the common 
cultural experience of broadcasting. 
X. CON CL US/ON 
This article advances a principle of fairness as an alternative 
to the polar positions of free flow and prior consent over interna-
tional satellite radio and television transmission, with specific 
reference to the upcoming 1983 Regional Administrative Radio 
Conference of Western Hemisphere countries to determine inter-
national DBS policy. Under the fairness principle, transborder 
satellite broadcasting would be both promoted and controlled by 
multinational public and private institutions. Although some prior 
consent would still be required under the fairness principle, coun-
tries would give their consent at the time they entered into inter-
national institutional arrangements to regulate DBS program-
ming, thus avoiding the problems of unilateral and per program 
censorship. It is concluded that adoption of the fairness principle 
by the U.S. in international DBS negotiations would be fully com-
patible with domestic constitutional values and administrative 
regulations, that the fairness principle has unique advantages as 
compared with the other proposed policies for DBS, and that it of-
fers the most promising route to implementation of transborder 
satellite communication in the Western Hemisphere. 
The fairness principle represents a common law, rather than 
code, approach to the problems of international DBS service and is 
140. See remarks of Abram Chayes in Control of Program Content, supra note 48, at 
40-67. 
[W]e have all departed a long way from the free flow of information concept as 
an absolute principle and we are talking practicalities. All of us have a somewhat dif-
ferent view of practicality, but I think it is time to go back to what ... is the best 
strategy for increasing the free flow of information .... Is it to try to impose our 
moral absolutist view all around the world? Or is it to try to get something going 
that we can expand and build up? 
Id. at 65. 
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more easily implemented on a regional level. Nonetheless, agree-
ment among Western Hemisphere countries on the objectives and 
institutional arrangements necessary for commencement of trans-
border broadcasting will take time and is unlikely to be achieved 
by the 1983 RARC. This lag in consensus is particularly troubling, 
since any initial structural or operational decisions made at the 
1983 RARC regarding DBS service may, like initial decisions re-
garding other mass communication technology, have an enduring 
impact and preclude future policy options. For this reason it is 
suggested that some orbital assignments and transmitting fre-
quencies be reserved expressly for international DBS service to 
the people of the Americas at the 1983 RARC. Structural reserva-
tions for international DBS service would not only protect cross-
border communication from foreclosure by national interests, but 
would also serve to spur creative collaboration to utilize these 
resources. 
The potential of international DBS radio and television to ad-
vance common understanding and respect among people of dif-
ferent nations and cultures is great. Each generation of mass com-
munication technology, from the advent of AM radio, has expanded 
social communities and produced new appreciation of the common 
needs and interests of people. With DBS technology, we are poised 
on the threshold of international communities and the realization 
of a better world order. Indeed, fulfillment of our present technolo-
gical potential for cross-cultural communication may be our best 
hope to avoid military confrontation. Why then, with the oppor-
tunities so rich and the aJternatives so grave, have the nations of 
the world made so little progress in almost a quarter of a century 
toward accommodation on DBS policy? It would seem that there is 
a deeply felt concern (if not a fear) shared by developed and devel-
oping nations alike over the long term impact of radio and televi-
sion. No country can be certain of how modern mass communica-
tion systems will affect social and political structures, or of how 
people possessed of more information and freedom of choice will 
choose to organize their society and to interact in the global com-
munity. On another level, there may also be an individual ethical 
uncertainty which has undermined accommodation. Morality, after 
all, has meaning only in the choices of free and informed men and 
women. No one can be certain of the moral code by which free per-
sons will exercise their freedom in the future. 
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These governmental and individual uncertainties are easily 
understandable and have been present at each stage of mass com-
munication development. Solutions to these obstacles in the past 
have come not so much from political negotiations as from a 
shared faith in the future-faith in the promise of the technology 
and faith in the common sense and compassion of people in the 
utilization of new communication resources. Of all the nations of 
the world, the U.S. should have confidence in the future of tele-
communications technology and faith in freedom of information 
and individual choice. 
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